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[1147] 
American Unicameralism:  
The Structure of Local Legislatures 
NOAH M. KAZIS* 
The bicameral legislature is a cornerstone of the Madisonian system, a basic 
assumption of American constitutionalism. But a different constitutional vision is 
hidden in plain sight. Of the more than 90,000 local governments in the United 
States¾many of which began as bicameral before abandoning the federal 
model¾each has now chosen a single chambered legislature. Efficiency and 
majoritarianism, not internal checks and balances, have driven the design of local 
legislatures. Local governments are not merely smaller units than states or the federal 
government; they have their own structure and their own animating principles. 
Theories built on bicameralism, including statutory interpretation methodologies and 
modes of judicial review, must be adapted for local, unicameral governments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * Corporation Counsel Honors Fellow, New York City Law Department. Yale Law School, J.D. 
2015. This Article reflects the Author’s views alone, and not those of the New York City Law 
Department. I am grateful for insightful comments from Robert Ellickson, Suzanne Kahn, Richard 
Kazis, David Schleicher, Danny Townsend, and from Nestor Davidson, Nadav Shoked and the other 
participants in the Fordham International and Comparative Urban Law Conference. Thank you also 
to my very helpful editors at the Hastings Law Journal.  
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A single branch of Legislation is a many headed Monster which without 
any check must soon defeat the very purposes for which it was created, and 
its members become a Tyranny dreadful in proportion to the numbers 
which compose it.1 
 
Today here in Philadelphia, we have an autocracy due to the rigidity of the 
present organization and the cumbersomeness of the city’s government 
machinery.2 
 
 1. Letter from William Hooper, Delegate from N.C. to the Cont’l Congress, to the Cong. at Halifax 
(Oct. 26, 1776), in 10 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1775–76 867 (William L. Saunders ed., 
1886) (quoted in John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 770 n. 283 (2002)).  
 2. One Council Plan Gains in Favor, Charter Revision Along That Idea Is Indorsed Generally, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 11, 1919, at 6 (quoting Clinton Rogers Woodruff on Philadelphia’s bicameral city 
council).  
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INTRODUCTION 
On December 16, 2013, the Common Council of Everett, 
Massachusetts met for its regularly scheduled session.3 The Common 
Council moved through its sixteen-item agenda in just over an hour, 
performing such ordinary civic tasks as voting to accept $20 in donations 
for the city’s Veterans Services Department and adopting amendments 
to the zoning ordinance.4 Its meeting complete, the Common Council 
never convened again.5 Neither did the Everett Board of Aldermen, which 
had met the same evening.6 Effective January 2014, Everett had 
abolished its bicameral legislature, replacing the Common Council and 
Board of Aldermen¾established 119 years before¾with a single new City 
Council.7 With that, America’s last bicameral local government was no 
more.8  
Our national legislature, of course, has a Senate and a House of 
Representatives.9 Bicameralism is heralded as a cornerstone of the 
American system of government, a hallmark of checks-and-balances 
taught proudly in grade school civics.10 In the states, too, bicameralism is 
also the standard. Of the fifty states, forty-nine are bicameral¾Nebraska 
is the sole exception.11 From the traditional perspective of a two-level, 
national/state vision of federalism,12 bicameralism appears as the 
American form of legislature.  
But one Congress and fifty state legislatures are only the tip of the 
iceberg, quantitatively. There are more than 90,000 local governments 
in the United States.13 Each and every one has a single legislative 
chamber. Peering upwards from the local point of view, unicameralism 
appears predominant; the few bicameral governments appear 
 
 3. Joseph Domelowicz, Jr., Zoning By-laws Updated to Match New Charter, EVERETT INDEP. 
(Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.everettindependent.com/2013/12/20/zoning-by-laws-updated-to-
match-new-charter/. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Steven A. Rosenberg, Everett Finally Abandoning Its Bicameral Government, BOS. GLOBE 
(Dec. 8, 2011), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/12/08/Everetts 
_bicameral_government_will_become_historical_footnote_in_2014/?page=1. 
 8. Id.  
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I.  
 10. See, e.g., MICH. DEP’T OF EDUC., MICHIGAN K-12 STANDARDS, SOCIAL STUDIES, AUG. 2015 DRAFT 
REVISIONS 54 (2015), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mde/SS_COMBINED_August 
_2015_496557_7.pdf (listing bicameralism among key terms and features of Constitution for eighth 
grade history curriculum).  
 11. Kim Robak, The Nebraska Unicameral and Its Lasting Benefits, 76 NEB. L. REV. 791, 792 
(1997). 
 12. See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term Foreword: Federalism All the Way 
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22 (2010).  
 13. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS tbl. 2, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY TYPE AND 
STATE (2012).  
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exceptional. On this most fundamental question of legislative structure, 
one chamber or two, local government law has rejected the consensus of 
the state and federal governments. Local government law has adopted its 
own constitutional vision and this constitutional alternative has been 
hidden in plain sight.  
This Article provides the first sustained exploration of local 
unicameralism. It fills a major gap in our understanding of the 
institutional structure of local governments¾and therefore our 
federalist system. As Nestor Davidson recently argued, legal scholars pay 
far “too little attention to the inner workings of local government.”14 
Local government scholarship has, for decades, focused on 
intergovernmental relationships: in the vertical direction, local 
autonomy from state control; in the horizontal direction, competition 
and coordination between municipalities.15 These are important, 
distinctive features of local government, whose powers are legally limited 
by the states that create them, and practically constrained by city/suburb 
relationships.  
But local governments are also distinct in their internal structure. 
For too long, courts and scholars alike have treated local governments as 
“the smallest matryoshka doll nestled within increasingly larger state and 
federal counterparts, with the classic tripartite structure repeated in 
miniature” when, in fact, local governments are organized entirely 
differently.16 Scholars understand that federal constitutional structure 
has wide-ranging implications across all areas of the law. But only 
recently have local government scholars turned their attention to  
intra-governmental structure.17 This Article adds to that nascent 
literature. Recent scholarship has looked at local administrative law,18 
 
 14. Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 570 (2017). 
 15. Id. at 575; see also Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 
900–01 (2013) (most local government law “is engaged in foundational debates surrounding the role 
of local governments within our state and federal constitutional structures”); Nestor M. Davidson, 
Leaps and Bounds, 108 MICH. L. REV. 957, 957–58 (2010) (reviewing GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. 
BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008)) (noting that Professors Frug and 
Barron set out to provide a “comprehensive, empirical look at the legal frameworks under which cities 
and other local governments operate” but describing their actual subject as “home rule”).  
 16. Davidson, supra note 14, at 596.  
 17. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 14; Clayton P. Gillette, Can Municipal Political Structure 
Improve Fiscal Performance?, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 571 (2013–2014); Richard C. Schragger, Can 
Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 
YALE L.J. 2542, 2546 (2006) (noting, in discussion of strong mayoral form of government, that “almost 
nothing has been written about the mayoralty in the legal literature”); David Schleicher, City 
Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670 (2013) (explaining land use politics through lens of election law and 
internal legislative processes).  
 18. Davidson, supra note 14. 
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local election law,19 local judiciaries,20 and the various ways the 
mayoralty can be structured.21 This Article turns to a different 
branch¾the legislative¾and begins the work of understanding how local 
governments’ distinct legislative structures affect local government law 
and public law more broadly.22  
At the national level, legislative structure is given its proper due. 
Bicameralism stands as a pillar of federal constitutionalism, widely, and 
correctly, understood to be a foundational feature of the national 
government. The Framers argued vociferously for a bicameral federal 
legislature. In Federalist 22, for example, Alexander Hamilton declared 
that should a newly empowered federal government share with the 
Articles of Confederation a unicameral legislature, it would be 
“inconsistent with all the principles of good government,” and liable to 
“accumulate, in a single body, all the most important prerogatives of 
sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable 
forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived.”23 Better, 
Hamilton argued in a later publication, “to divide the legislature into 
different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election 
and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as 
the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on 
the society will admit.”24 During the constitutional convention, James 
Wilson stated that a unicameral legislature would lead to “a Legislative 
despotism.”25 Explained Wilson, “If the Legislative authority be not 
restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be 
restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent 
branches.”26 
Indeed, the importance of bicameralism¾both the fact of it and the 
details¾led the Framers to make the “equal suffrage in the Senate” of 
each state the only proviso of the Constitution that could never27 be 
 
 19. Schleicher, supra note 18, at 1699–1704; David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan 
Competition in City Council Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419 (2007). 
 20. Leib, supra note 15; Ethan J. Leib, Local Judges and Local Government, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 707 (2015). 
 21. Schragger, supra note 17.  
 22. In spoken remarks at a 2004 N.Y.U. symposium, Richard Briffault called out for a new 
analysis of legislative process in state and local government. Richard A. Briffault, Beyond Congress: 
The Study of State and Local Legislatures, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (2003). Without drawing 
any conclusions, Briffault briefly outlined a slew of differences between Congress and subnational 
legislatures, offering each as worthy of scholarly understanding. Although Briffault’s call has not been 
widely heeded, this Article is in many ways an attempt to take up that banner. 
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 25. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 254 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (statement 
of James Wilson, June 16, 1787).  
 26. Id.  
 27. Amendments affecting the Constitutional provisions concerning slavery were immune to 
amendment until 1808. U.S. CONST. art. V.  
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amended according to the ordinary procedures of Article V.28 
Bicameralism was given special stature in the constitutional scheme even 
compared to other fundamental structural features of the new national 
government.29 
Contemporary constitutional observers paint bicameralism in the 
same glorious light as did the founding generation. The Supreme Court 
has described bicameralism as serving “essential constitutional 
functions,” and meant “to protect the people from the improvident 
exercise of power.”30 Leading scholars and officials have described 
bicameralism as one of “the base institutions of the Constitution,”31 part 
of “the machinery of our popular form of government,”32 and a 
“hallmark[] of American government.”33  
But these paeans to bicameralism notwithstanding, “American 
government” is not, in fact, defined by bicameralism, nor do unified 
legislatures inexorably extinguish liberty and stability alike. 
Quantitatively and qualitatively, unicameral governments play a 
substantial role in our system of self-governance. In 2012, the country 
had 3031 counties,34 all of which were unicameral.35 There were 19,519 
municipalities and 16,360 towns and townships, all unicameral.36 The 
nation’s 51,146 special districts serve a dramatic array of functions, but 
never is a second chamber used to govern the nation’s hospital, highway, 
or housing districts.37 Unicameralism, deemed “inconsistent with all the 
principles of good government” at the federal level, is preferred for every 
 
 28. Id. (“[N]o state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”). 
There is scholarly debate over whether this provision can be amended or evaded although practically 
speaking, the Senate is not going anywhere. See Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be 
Amended? 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1981); Lester B. Orfield, The Scope of the Federal Amending Power, 
28 MICH. L. REV. 550 (1930); Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses,  
13 CONST. COMMENTARY 107 (1996); Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution 
Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21, 68–72 (1997). 
 29. Baker & Dinkin, supra note 28, at 21 (“The apportionment of representation in the United 
States Senate has always held an exalted place in our constitutional democracy.”). Of course, 
bicameralism’s status represents raw political compromise as well as principled commitment, but 
principles were in play. Indeed, there was always agreement about the need for bicameralism, even if 
the “Great Compromise” between large and small states was necessary to determine the 
apportionment of the two chambers. Dan T. Coenen, The Originalist Case Against Congressional 
Supermajority Voting Rules, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1091, 1145–51 (2012). 
 30. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 957 (1983). 
 31. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1561 (1988). 
 32. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 981–82 (1987).  
 33. Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational 
Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 275–76 n.6 (2001). 
 34. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 13, at tbl. 2.  
 35. TOM TODD, MINN. HOUSE OF REP., UNICAMERAL OR BICAMERAL STATE LEGISLATURES: THE 
POLICY DEBATE 12 (1999), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/uni-bicam.pdf (“Local 
governments in the United States all have unicameral governing bodies.”); see supra notes 7-8 and 
accompanying text.  
 36. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 13, at tbl. 2.  
 37. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 13, at tbl. 9. 
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local function in the country.38 Nor are those local functions 
inconsequential. Local unicameral governments oversee more than 10.5 
million public employees: the frontline workers in basic governmental 
functions from education to law enforcement to sanitation.39 Citizens, 
serving as legislators in these tens of thousands of governments, learn 
the traditions and practices of unicameralism. The contrast between 
constitutional conventional wisdom and the on-the-ground reality of 
local government serves as the conceptual engine for this Article, its 
driving puzzle. 
It deeply misunderstands American government, therefore, to 
elevate bicameralism to the special status it has been granted. 
Bicameralism is an essential American institution. Unicameralism is an 
essential American institution. It is impossible to understand American 
government without understanding bicameralism, yet scholars and 
courts have made the same mistake by ignoring the unicameral side of 
our constitutional structure. This Article recognizes the dual nature of 
our legislative institutions. 
Judges have not reshaped doctrine to distinguish between 
unicameral and bicameral legislatures. In the rare instances where courts 
even discuss local unicameralism, it is usually because a local board was 
improperly constituted as unicameral or bicameral under local law.40 In 
the still-less-common cases where litigants have attempted to distinguish 
unicameral legislatures on principle, the courts have not followed.41  
Other scholars have noted the unicameral nature of local 
government only in passing. Richard Briffault, in short spoken remarks, 
has identified local unicameralism as important and unique to local 
government.42 But beyond posing the question of what unicameralism 
might mean, Briffault offered no answer, noting only that that “it does 
change the dynamic of the legislative process.”43 As for the causes of local 
unicameralism, Saul Levmore has addressed local unicameralism as part 
of a short exploration of why bicameralism might be favored over 
alternative forms of supermajority requirement.44 Levmore asserts that 
 
 38. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 23. 
 39. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2015 ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT & PAYROLL tbl. EP1500A3, 
Local Government Employment and Payroll Data: March 2015 (2015). 
 40. See Lowe v. City of Bowling Green, 247 S.W.2d 386, 387 (Ky. 1952) (invalidating statute 
enacted by unicameral “Common Council” after city grew to size that, under state law, required 
bicameral “General Council”); Rhode Island Episcopal Convention v. City Council of Providence, 159 
A. 647, 648 (R.I. 1932) (invalidating statute enacted by both chambers of city council voting in 
aggregate, as single entity). 
 41. See, e.g., Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 613 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that 
absolute legislative immunity does not depend on legislative structure). 
 42. Briffault, supra note 22, at 26.  
 43. Briffault, supra note 22, at 26. 
 44. Saul Levmore, Commentary, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?,  
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 145 (1992). Specifically, Levmore argues that bicameralism is meant to block 
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while state governments require the stopping power of bicameralism, 
local governments can be checked by residents’ exit power, their ability 
to vote with their feet.45 While Levmore’s analysis provides an important 
kernel of insight for understanding local unicameralism, his aim is only 
to sketch a simple framework for understanding state and national 
bicameralism. He does not offer any empirical evidence for his 
conception of local unicameralism, any additional factors driving local 
governments to adopt unicameralism, or any indication of why local 
unicameralism might matter.  
For others, unicameralism is offered as a stand-alone data point that 
helps distinguish local government from the states. Helen Hershkoff has 
argued that federal justiciability doctrines are not applicable in state 
courts.46 In a single sentence, she notes that local governments may be 
even more different from the federal model than states, noting that, 
among other things, they “may be unicameral.”47 Paul Diller, in a 
wonderfully creative article asking why cities have led policy innovation 
in public health, suggests as one of many reasons that local legislatures 
have fewer veto points: not only are they unicameral, but they tend not 
to require supermajorities to pass legislation and have a less complex 
committee structure.48 Clayton Gillette, in a sustained analysis of why 
local governments pursue redistribution, includes the fact that “[s]tate 
legislative processes are also more likely than local ones to be 
characterized by bicameral legislatures” as one variable explaining the 
power of the status quo in state legislatures.49 Finally, Lynn Baker argues 
that unicameral local governments are less likely to protect racial 
minorities and that, as a result, her defense of state-level plebiscites 
would be stronger at the local level.50 
 
legislation enacted in haste or by small minorities without stopping too much legislation that enjoys 
the support of majorities¾it is meant to help quality legislation supported by, say, fifty-five percent of 
the public, to pass. Id. at 157–58.  
 45. Id. at 161 (“The imposition of external costs requires a captive set of losers.”). 
 46. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (2001). 
 47. Id. at 1925. 
 48. Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Structure, 
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1266–67 (2014).  
 49. CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND 
THE COURTS 181 (2011). 
 50. Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective,  
67 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 707, 716 n.21 (1991) (“To the extent that even these representative bodies are 
not found to provide racial minorities better protection against disadvantageous legislation than 
plebiscites, the case will be even stronger with regard to local representative lawmaking bodies.”). 
Somewhat strangely, Baker also suggests that there is “no analogue of the gubernatorial veto” at the 
local level, id., when mayoral vetoes are common in “strong mayor” systems. See, e.g., SEATTLE CITY 
CHARTER, art. IV, § 12 (describing veto power). This is indicative of how even where scholars have 
identified local unicameralism as important, local government has been an afterthought. 
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These mentions of local unicameralism¾some as fleeting as one 
sentence¾indicate its importance. As these scholars demonstrate, 
unicameralism has implications across issue areas. But these scholars’ 
attention is elsewhere, and they provide no sustained investigation of 
local unicameralism. This Article provides the thorough explanation of 
both the causes and implications of local unicameralism that this basic 
structural fact merits.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. After this introduction, Part I 
offers a historical perspective, laying an empirical foundation for how 
both local and state legislatures took their present forms. Local 
governments were not always unicameral, and state governments were 
not always bicameral. Each made choices¾contested, ideological 
choices¾over how to structure themselves. Returning to those moments 
of contest reveals why citizens settled on the legislative structures that 
now seem intuitive. With a zeal for efficiency, American cities across the 
country and across more than a century¾from the mid-1800s to the late 
20th century¾embraced modernization and paid short shrift to 
tradition. The states, in contrast, sought the dignity of sharing a 
legislative structure with the federal government and feared unchecked 
legislative power.  
Part II then marries those historical foundations to contemporary 
theoretical understandings of local government to identify the root 
causes of local unicameralism. I reject the simplest explanation for local 
unicameralism that local governments are so powerless that checks and 
balances are pointless. Local government wields enormous power within 
its sphere of influence, and residents care deeply about its choices. 
Neighbors pack zoning hearings, parents intervene in the smallest 
classroom decisions, and people march and sometimes riot over police 
behavior. That said, constraints on local power, whether interlocal 
competition or state oversight, do provide a partial explanation of local 
unicameralism: The worst-case scenarios of unchecked power are 
somewhat less threatening.  
But at the same time, paradoxically, local power¾particularly over 
land use and education¾also explains unicameralism. At the local level, 
residents sort themselves into communities with shared values and a 
common (often exclusionary) political agenda. Voters want their local 
governments to exercise their powers efficiently, even ruthlessly, to 
defend the land use controls and school systems that define their 
communities and support their property values. Unicameralism removes 
the roadblocks to these popular forms of local authority.  
The structure of local legislatures also reflects the executive 
branches with which they interact. Local governments are 
disproportionately responsible for implementation and service delivery, 
as compared to policymaking, and accordingly, they are dominated by 
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their executive branches. Local unicameralism is a response to executive 
power. If executives control government¾and can act even without 
legislative input¾legislatures must speak with one voice in order to 
counteract the administration, as unicameral legislatures are better able 
to do.  
The executive nature of local government provides a final 
explanation for local unicameralism. Local legislatures are not imbued 
with great symbolic significance. While state and federal legislatures (or 
local executives) are sites of civic identity, not lightly changed, local 
legislatures simply are not. Local legislatures, and perhaps local 
governments generally, are perceived more instrumentally.51 
Local unicameralism is important in its own right¾we should 
understand how our cities, towns, school districts and counties 
function—but its significance ripples across the law. In Part III, I explore 
how local unicameralism might affect three long-running debates in legal 
scholarship. Within local government law, local unicameralism cuts 
against established theories of participatory localism, which praise local 
government as a site for civic engagement. Local legislatures are 
designed for efficiency and instrumentalism, not participation. Those 
seeking consensus and deliberation in their local governments would do 
well to look outside the legislative branch. Next, widening the lens to 
broad questions of statutory interpretation, local unicameralism might 
allow greater reliance on legislative history. The constitutional 
arguments against using legislative history do not translate to a 
unicameral context. Finally, when reviewing local statutes’ 
constitutionality, courts should adjust their practice of judicial review to 
the hyper-majoritarianism of local government. Judges should grant 
greater leeway to experimentalism and policy innovation but impose 
stricter oversight over exclusionary or expropriative actions.  
This Article offers no definitive or comprehensive declaration of the 
meaning of local unicameralism. A single fact about legislative structure 
could hardly resolve such essential issues as judicial review, and 
conversely, unicameralism is so foundational a fact about local 
governmental structure that it surely has other implications. Necessarily, 
this Article only begins a conversation it cannot conclude. Our 
constitutional system, when taken as a whole, divides the work of 
legislation between bicameral and unicameral governments. We must no 
longer ignore the second half of that system.  
 
 51. This is consistent with the doctrinal fact that local governments are mere instrumentalities of 
the state. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) (“Municipal corporations are political 
subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental 
powers of the state . . . .”). 
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A. DEFINING UNICAMERALISM 
In the local context, precisely defining unicameralism and 
bicameralism proves surprisingly difficult. It is more or less obvious that 
Congress is bicameral: Both the House and Senate must each act, 
separately but concurrently, to pass a bill.52 However, the explosion of 
local governmental forms, which rarely parallel national institutions 
exactly, renders this more complex. Bicameral local legislatures need not 
look like Congress and unicameral local legislatures need not look like 
the House of Representatives. 
First, there is not always separation of powers at the local level.53 In 
weak mayor systems, the mayor is simply the first council member 
among many. In council-manager systems, as in parliamentary systems, 
there is no elected executive at all.54 Some entities, such as zoning boards, 
perform legislative, judicial, and executive functions.55 Thus, it can be 
more difficult to identify where the legislative power is exercised.  
Second, while in the federal system “all legislative powers” are 
granted to Congress,56 legislative powers can be disaggregated by 
function at the local level. A school board might be elected separately 
from a city or town council, for example.57 These are two separate bodies, 
each essentially legislative, but without concurrent authority. This Article 
is not about the separation of legislative powers across different 
government entities, but about the separation of powers within the 
legislature of a single local government. Even within a single 
government, the legislative power might be divided functionally across 
different entities. For example, in a small number of Maine towns, an 
 
 52. That committees within each chamber might be required to act, that the Senate has an 
effective supermajority requirement in the filibuster, and that the President may veto legislation 
affects the shape of the legislative process but not the basic fact of bicameralism. That the Senate alone 
acts on treaty ratification and in confirming presidential appointments arguably does make our 
legislature unicameral in those areas. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.  
 53. Cf. Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 579–80 n.16 (R.I. 2011) (noting that “the separation of 
powers doctrine is a concept foreign to municipal governance” and collecting cases). 
 54. See Schragger, supra note 17, at 2548 (describing council-manager systems); H. George 
Frederickson et al., The Changing Structure of American Cities: A Study of the Diffusion of 
Innovation, 64 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 320, 320 (2004) (comparing council-manager cities to 
parliamentary systems).  
 55. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Taylor, Note, Untangling the Law of Site-Specific Rezoning in Florida: 
A Critical Evaluation of the Functional Approach, 45 FLA. L. REV. 873, 892 n.155 (1993) (“[Z]oning 
boards are vested with the legislative function in creating a comprehensive plan, the judicial function 
in granting variances and special exemptions, and the executive function in hiring agents to enforce 
zoning and building codes.”).  
 56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.  
 57. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37 (2018) (describing school committees as part of towns 
and cities); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 1 (2018) (describing process for election of school 
committees in towns).  
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open town meeting votes on the budget while an elected council passes 
all other legislation.58 
To tread carefully, I use the following definition of unicameralism. 
Unicameralism means the entity that exercises a given legislative power 
is organized as one chamber. That chamber can take legislative actions 
according to any sort of internal decisionmaking processes. Whether that 
is majority vote or supermajority, guided through committees or 
otherwise, is immaterial, even if those internal processes create multiple 
“vetogates.”59 In bicameralism, two separate and independent chambers 
must concurrently agree to take legislative action.  
Accordingly, a local government can have two or more separate 
unicameral legislatures with nonoverlapping substantive jurisdictions: a 
general legislature and a specialized school committee or planning board, 
for example. Those legislatures might be parliamentary or, in their field, 
paired with an independent executive.  
Notably, this means that local unicameralism might involve a 
diminution in checks and balances or an abandonment of the  
checks-and-balances model altogether. In some cases, the legislature and 
the executive still check each other, but the legislature no longer checks 
itself.60 In others, the legislature is the only body of local government, 
without any internal separation of powers: the mayor might be part of 
the legislature and the judiciary separately operated by the state. 
Unicameralism is always a move away from the Madisonian system, but 
how far a local government departs from that model varies. For this 
Article, what matters is the concurrency of decisionmaking within the 
designated legislative zone.61 Under this definition, many local 
governments began as bicameral, and all have now converged on 
unicameral legislative designs. The next Part describes that history. 
 
 58. Citizen’s Guide to Town Meeting, ME. MUN. ASS’N, https://www.memun.org/Training 
Resources/LocalGovernment/AGuidetoTownMeeting.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).  
 59. Vetogates are the many points in the legislative process where a bill can die, from substantive 
committees and rules committees to conference between two chambers to an executive veto. See 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444–46 
(2008).  
 60. Legislative unicameralism is often accompanied by increased checks from the executive 
branch. This is notably common in the land use context. For example, zoning decisions may be made 
in the first instance by an executive-branch planning commission, then ratified by the city council. See, 
e.g., N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-d (2011). While this shares important features with bicameralism, in that 
two multimember bodies must both vote on a proposal for it to become law, it implicates  
interbranch separation of powers, not intra-legislative bicameralism: It is more akin to the presidential 
veto than to Congressional bicameralism. Indeed, the relative importance of checks between the 
executive and legislative branches at the local level, as opposed to checks within the legislature, is a 
major theme of this Article. See infra Part II.C.  
 61. Although outside the scope of this Article, it could be illuminating to compare the structure of 
local legislatures to the structure of local multimember executive boards and commissions, especially 
where those boards are elected. There may be patterns to local organization that cross the branches.  
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I.  HOW WE GOT HERE 
A. A HISTORY OF LOCAL UNICAMERALISM 
All local governments¾not many or most, but all¾are unicameral. 
The choice to have one legislative chamber rather than two is a defining 
feature of the design of local governments. And it is a choice. Unlike most 
structural features of our government, no constitutional rule¾federal or 
state¾requires local legislatures to have a single chamber. Despite its 
utterly uniform nature, there is nothing compulsory or fixed about local 
unicameralism. Moreover, local unicameralism is not one constitutional 
choice, made at the Founding, or even fifty constitutional choices made 
in the states. Local unicameralism is the convergence of thousands of 
individual actors independently reaching the same conclusion across a 
period of more than a century. 
Local governments were not always unicameral. They have moved 
steadily in that direction over two centuries. In 1903, one-third of large 
cities still had bicameral councils.62 Bicameralism was a common,  
high-profile option for local legislatures at the turn of the 20th century. 
Nor did American local governments slide into unicameralism unawares. 
Local unicameralism is the product of political conflict and intellectual 
debate, carried out city-by-city and state-by-state. Yet that debate has 
long since ended, making unicameralism appear to be the natural form 
of local government. To uncover what pushes local governments into 
unicameralism, it helps to turn to the past, when the choice of local 
legislative form was a live controversy.  
This Part traces the history of local unicameralism from the colonial 
era¾when the basic separation of government into branches was not yet 
present at the local level¾through 2014, when Everett, Massachusetts 
finally gave up its status as the last bicameral city in America. That 
history shows consistent motives for local unicameralism, across 
centuries and from coast to coast. Its proponents saw unicameral 
legislatures as more efficient¾not hampered by the need for consensus 
across two fractious bodies¾and evoked images of modernity to support 
their desired overhaul of the legislative machine. More mundanely, the 
unicameralists also pointed to cost savings: eliminating one legislative 
chamber meant fewer salaries to pay.  
The defenders of bicameralism, in turn, claimed the ground of 
tradition, a tradition ennobled by the federal example. They cited the 
value of checks and balances to restrain government overreach. Finally, 
they celebrated two-chamber legislatures as offering more positions for 
more politicians, increasing public access to their officials and offering 
more opportunities for those officials to advance. Of course, mixed in 
 
 62. George W. Liebmann, The New American Local Government, 34 URB. LAW. 93, 107 (2002).  
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with these principles was politics: one faction or another, varying from 
city to city, always perceived a potential advantage in a new legislative 
design. But putting the contingencies of any place’s particular political 
line-up aside, the debates over local unicameralism¾pitting tradition 
against modernity and efficiency against restraint¾provides a rigorous 
foundation for beginning the study of local legislative form.  
The earliest American local governments did not share even the 
most basic trappings of contemporary municipal government. Legally, 
cities were understood as corporations.63 As such, their internal 
governance diverged dramatically from what we now consider 
democratic norms. For example, under Philadelphia’s 1701 Proprietor’s 
Charter, which governed the city until 1776, the officers of the 
Corporation of Philadelphia chose their own successors.64 These 
corporations¾like business corporations today65¾operated with a 
single council and generally without a clear separation of powers.66 
Councils during the colonial period and the early republic were often 
unicameral, but did not particularly resemble legislatures as we know 
them today.  
Local government began to take its modern shape only after the 
Constitutional convention gave the national government a fixed and 
culturally resonant form. Baltimore created the first recognizably 
bicameral city council in 1797.67 The new Baltimore legislature consisted 
of a sixteen-member lower house and an eight-member upper house.68 
This structure expressly mimicked the federal model: in an innovation 
that did not spread, Baltimore elected its mayor using an electoral 
college.69 
Older American cities shifted away from colonial modes of 
governance and towards bicameralism during the early 19th century. 
 
 63. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1095–98 (1980). Frug 
contests whether early American local governments were in fact corporations or  
“quasi-corporations,” but agrees that the law treated them as corporations. Id. 
 64. City Council, CITY OF PHILA. DEP’T RECORDS, http://www.phila.gov/phils/Docs/Inventor/ 
graphics/agencies/A120.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). 
 65. Cf. Levmore, supra note 44, at 162 (comparing unicameralism of local government to 
corporate boards).  
 66. Michele Frisby, Separating the Powers, in HOW AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS WORK:  
A HANDBOOK OF CITY, COUNTY, REGIONAL, STATE AND FEDERAL OPERATIONS 105 (Roger L. Kemp ed., 
2002); see also Hendrik Hartog, Because All the World Was Not New York City: Governance, 
Property Rights, and the State in the Changing Definition of a Corporation, 1730–1860, 28 BUFF. L. 
REV. 91, 98 (1979) (“As in other governmental entities, the practice of government in colonial New 
York City was functionally undifferentiated; judicial, administrative, and legislative powers were 
blurred and diffuse.”).  
 67. Frisby, supra note 66, at 106. But see City Council, supra note 64 (describing Philadelphia’s 
Council, created in 1789, consisting of both aldermen and Common Council members. Both sets of 
councilors jointly selected the Mayor, who sat with them to form a unitary Council). 
 68. Frisby, supra note 66, at 106.  
 69. Frisby, supra note 66, at 106. 
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Boston abandoned its town meeting form of government in its 1822 
charter.70 The new charter replaced the popular assembly as the site of 
legislative power, with a forty-eight-member common council and a 
twelve-person board of aldermen.71 Bicameralism was widespread 
among early American cities.72 
By the turn-of-the-century Progressive Era, however, the tide had 
turned against bicameralism. The shift to unicameralism in Philadelphia 
provides a representative illustration. In Philadelphia, the City Charter 
was revised to institute a unicameral City Council in 1919.73 The fight for 
charter reform, which included a variety of other “good government” 
reforms,74 was led by two factions: business and civic elites, on the one 
hand, and on the other, one of two warring factions of the Pennsylvania 
Republican party, which meant to use reform to take power in 
Philadelphia.75 The reformers, quintessential Progressives, saw 
unicameralism as a force for modernity and efficiency¾making it an 
effective form of self-governance¾as well as a force against the urban 
machines they despised.76  
Efficiency formed the heart of the intellectual argument for charter 
reform in Philadelphia. Pennsylvania Governor William Sproul, who 
went so far as to advocate for Philadelphia charter reform in his inaugural 
address, described bicameralism as “unwieldy.”77 Clinton Rogers 
Woodruff, a leader of the charter reformers, called the bicameral 
legislature “probably the worst governing body that has ever  
mis-administered over a great city,” and identified as the remedy a single, 
unicameral Council.78 In fighting for unicameralism, elite reformers 
fought for a vision of “strong, simple, representative government.”79 
Woodruff described Philadelphia’s bicameral (and gerrymandered) 
legislature as “an autocracy” given the “cumbersomeness of the city’s 
 
 70. Charlie Tebbetts, Charter Changes in Boston from 1885-1949, 32 HIST. J. MASS. 21 (2004). 
 71. Id.  
 72. According to a 1922 political scientist, a bicameral council originally governed “the majority 
of the cities.” EVERETT KIMBALL, STATE AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 411 (1922). 
The reliability of this estimate is uncertain, but the author’s research provides enough evidence to 
believe that bicameralism was at least commonplace.  
 73. City Council, supra note 64. 
 74. See Stamp out Bolshevism at Home, Demands Governor Sproul Education and Sane Laws 
Best Antidote, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 22, 1919, at 12 (describing other charter reform elements of home 
rule, fiscal controls, and the attempted depoliticization of the police force).  
 75. F. W. Coker, Notes on Municipal Affairs, 13 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 643, 643 (1919).  
 76. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 174–86 (1966) 
(describing Progressive Era local politics); Joan Chalmers Williams, The City, the Hope of Democracy: 
The Casebook as Moral Act, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1990) (reviewing GERALD FRUG, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW (1988)).  
 77. Stamp Out Bolshevism at Home, supra note 74.  
 78. City Laws Passe, Says Woodruff, Charter Revision Urged by Speaker at Business Club 
Luncheon Present, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 21, 1919, at 8. 
 79. Clinton Rogers Woodruff, Progress in Philadelphia, 26 AM. J. SOC. 315, 315 (1920).  
KAZIS-69.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/26/18 12:49 PM 
1162 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1147 
government machinery.”80 He wanted, and believed democracy required, 
a legislature that could act swiftly and decisively: “the substitution of an 
effective instrument for a clumsy one.”81  
These higher-minded ideals were paired with the desire to dislodge 
one faction of the Republican Party from its entrenched control of city 
government. Because legislative action required the concurrence of two 
large chambers, then totaling 146 members, reformers believed that 
machine control was necessary to coordinate action.82 That elites 
believed the machine to be “the one reaping the greatest benefits from 
the present bicameral Councils”¾as did the machine’s political rivals, 
who fortuitously controlled the state legislature83¾and considered this 
fact an essential argument for political reform.84 
Those advocating for unicameralism in Philadelphia necessarily 
argued that what was appropriate for the national and state governments 
was inapt at the local level. Said Leslie Miller, a leader of the Committee 
of Seventy, an elite Philadelphia civic organization: 
The existing system of copying and repeating in the management of 
municipal affairs the government machinery of the Nation and the 
State¾legislative, executive, judicial, and all that¾is certainly a mistake. 
It has had a fair trial and has continued far too long already, and whatever 
is to replace it, it should be abolished as completely as possible.85  
Writing in the American Journal of Sociology, Woodruff argued, 
“To expect satisfactory results from such a body modeled on the federal 
plan of government was to expect the impossible.”86 These leaders did 
not extend their critique of bicameralism to higher levels of government. 
Indeed, they saw it as self-evident that local government was different 
 
 80. One Council Plan Gains in Favor, Charter Revision Along That Idea is Indorsed Generally, 
supra note 2, at 6. 
 81. Woodruff, supra note 79, at 316.  
 82. David R. Contosta, George Woodward, Philadelphia Progressive, 111 PA. MAG. HIST.  
& BIOGRAPHY 341, 357 (1987).  
 83. THE COMM. OF SEVENTY, The Charter: A History 2 (1980), https://www.seventy.org/ 
uploads/files/127709242549666483-1980-charter-history.pdf. In Philadelphia and elsewhere, 
pushes for bicameralism were usually paired with efforts to reduce the total number of 
councilmembers. Efficiency thus took two distinct, though related paths: Reformers wanted to 
streamline operations within each chamber as well as across them. There is an extensive political 
science literature describing the public choice consequences of changing the number of legislatures 
per chamber and positing that a “law of 1/n” applies wherein more logrolling in larger bodies leads to 
increased government spending. See generally, e.g., Barry R. Weingast et al., The Political Economy 
of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642, 642, 
654 (1981). But see David M. Primo & James M. Snyder, Jr., Distributive Politics and the Law of 1/n*, 
70 J. POL. 477, 477 (2008) (describing many variables affecting “law”).  
 84. Big Men to Attend Charter Hearing, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 23, 1919, at 14. 
 85. Charter Revision Bills Soon Ready, Committee Plans to Present Bills to Legislature Next 
Month Indorsements, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 10, 1919, at 22. 
 86. Woodruff, supra note 79, at 315.  
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than state or national government, providing little principled argument 
for the difference.  
The Philadelphians’ distinction proved accurate descriptively: while 
state government remains largely bicameral, “the movement for 
simplified local government continue[d] on its triumphant way” 
throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries.87 As with many 
Progressive Era urban reforms, change came first to the West. After San 
Francisco ended the alcalde and ayuntamiento system of governance it 
inherited from Spain and Mexico, it experimented with a bicameral city 
council from 1850 to 1856 as its first Anglo-American-inspired system of 
government, moving to unicameralism just six years later.88 In charter 
revision fights that lasted the next half-century,89 it considered returning 
to bicameralism at various points, but never did so.90 Seattle’s brief fling 
with bicameralism lasted just as long. Seattle had a bicameral council 
under its original 1890 charter, but abandoned it only six years later.91 
The city considered two houses inefficient and paying two sets of 
legislators expensive.92 Indeed, the Seattle city council issued a joint 
resolution in its first year calling for a reduction in the number of city 
councilors.93 
In the East, too, advocates of unicameralism also saw reform as a 
modernizing and streamlining endeavor. Boston rewrote its charter in 
1909, moving to a unicameral, at-large system.94 As in Philadelphia and 
Seattle, good government groups wanted to replace an “unwieldy” 
system.95 The new system was modeled after the National Municipal 
League’s model charter, evidencing the importance of national 
intellectual trends and new Progressive institutions.96 Indeed, 
unicameralism could be deemed the Progressive Era’s most complete 
success in restructuring local government. While Progressive reforms 
like non-partisan elections and appointed city managers were important, 
 
 87. Woodruff, supra note 79, at 317. 
 88. WILLIAM A. BULLOUGH, THE BLIND BOSS & HIS CITY: CHRISTOPHER AUGUSTINE BUCKLEY AND 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY SAN FRANCISCO 54–55 (1979).  
 89. Id. at 257. 
 90. See CHARTER, PREPARED AND PROPOSED FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO art. II, § 1 
(1887) (“The Legislative power of the City and County of San Francisco shall be vested in two Houses 
of Legislation, which shall be designated the Supervisors of said city and county, and shall consist of a 
Board of Aldermen and a Board of Delegates.”). 
 91. Seattle City Council Members, 1890-1896, SEATTLE MUN. ARCHIVES, http://www. 
seattle.gov/cityarchives/seattle-facts/city-officials/city-council-members/city-council-1890-1896 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2018).  
 92. Seattle’s New Charter, OREGONIAN, Jan. 29, 1896, at 5.  
 93. Reconstruct the Charter, TACOMA DAILY NEWS, Dec. 3, 1890, at 4. 
 94. Tebbetts, supra note 70, at 14–15.  
 95. LAWRENCE W. KENNEDY, PLANNING THE CITY UPON A HILL: BOSTON SINCE 1630 122 (1992). 
 96. JAMES J. CONNOLLY, THE TRIUMPH OF ETHNIC PROGRESSIVISM: URBAN POLITICAL CULTURE IN 
BOSTON, 1900-1925 90 (2009).  
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new, and popular innovations in local government, neither was 
implemented so uniformly across the nation.97  
While factional politics were always important to the passage of 
unicameralism¾as is usually the case in urban politics¾there was no 
fixed arrangement of who lined up on which side of the issue. In Boston, 
for example, unicameralism (and associated reformers) was meant to 
“subvert the influence and power of the ward bosses, who had been the 
focal point of Irish and poor immigrant political opportunity.”98 But in 
Richmond, Virginia, disempowered groups were essential allies in the 
fight for unicameralism.  
Due to restrictions in the Virginia Constitution,99 Richmond 
remained one of the last cities with a bicameral council, changing to 
unicameralism only in a 1947 vote.100 Business elites once again led the 
fight for a single-chambered legislature, as elsewhere believing 
bicameralism to be “antiquated and clumsy” and not fit for a “modern” 
city.101 Interestingly, future Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, then a 
leader in the Richmond business community, chaired the charter 
commission that ultimately ended bicameralism in the city.102 
Richmond’s black community allied with Powell and the business 
community.103 Black leaders, including unicameralism supporters such 
as the president of the local NAACP, saw charter reform as a way to “kill 
red tape and political expediency by which Negroes are denied jobs and 
social justice.”104 Indeed, their bet paid immediate dividends. After 
charter reform, civil rights attorney Oliver Hill was elected to the City 
Council, the first African American to hold that position since 
 
 97. See Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Representation in Municipal Government, 
108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 612–13 (2014) (identifying these reforms as characteristic of Progressive 
Era attempts to make government more responsive); Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections, NAT’L 
LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/partisan-vs-nonpartisan-elections (categorizing thirty largest 
cities between partisan and nonpartisan electoral systems). 
 98. Tebbetts, supra note 70, at 15; see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unsubsidizing Suburbia,  
90 MINN. L. REV. 459, 474 (2005) (reviewing RICHARDSON DILWORTH, THE URBAN ORIGINS OF 
SUBURBAN AUTONOMY (2005)) (describing religious and ethnic politics of the era).  
 99. See VA. CONST. OF 1902, art. VIII, § 121, http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/ 
Virginia_1902.pdf; see also William Bennett Munro, Notes on Current Municipal Affairs, 3 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 245, 249 (1909) (noting that Richmond Mayor D.C. Richardson declared himself in favor of 
unicameral government, but constrained by Virginia constitution).  
 100. Many Cities O.K. Change in Government: Richmond Will Have Manager, CHI. DAILY TRIB., 
Dec 1, 1947, at 15 (identifying only fourteen American cities as still having bicameral councils after 
Richmond’s vote). 
 101. Associated Press, City Manager Is Advocated in Richmond, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1941, at 
19 (statement of the Richmond First Club).  
 102. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 124 (1994).  
 103. WILLIE AVON DRAKE & ROBERT D. HOLSWORTH, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE STALLED QUEST 
FOR BLACK PROGRESS 39 (1996). 
 104. Unicameral Council Advantages Explained: White Lawyer Advises Race To Study City 
Structure, RICHMOND NEW JOURNAL AND GUIDE, Mar. 6, 1937, at A2.  
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Reconstruction.105 While civic and business leaders supported 
unicameralism as a general rule, whom they allied with¾and whom 
unicameralism empowered¾varied depending on the particular political 
context and the other charter reforms with which it was paired.  
Despite the relentless trend towards unicameralism¾which was 
nearly unheard of for cities to move from a single-chambered to a double-
chambered legislature after the Civil War¾there was opposition in each 
city as debates actually took place. The debate in Atlanta, another late 
adopter of bicameralism, is instructive. In Atlanta, unicameralism was 
first enacted106 as part of a wide-ranging “Plan of Improvement” passed 
in the early 1950s which included the annexation of eighty-two square 
miles of territory, the consolidation of certain city and county functions, 
and other governmental reforms.107 The immediate impetus for change 
was a diagnosis of “suburbanitis . . . the inability of cities to cope with the 
paralyzing problem of urban developments on fringes just outside 
municipal limits,” and the cure was “more efficient local government” 
and “streamlin[ing].”108 A century after West Coast cities moved to 
unicameral legislatures, Atlanta was offering the same arguments in its 
favor, simply updated to the postwar context.  
The Atlantan arguments for retaining bicameralism, too, were the 
traditional ones found in other cities. Following the traditional 
arguments for bicameralism at the national level, some saw local 
bicameralism as providing important “checks on city finances.”109 In 
Atlanta, these opponents were mollified with new procedural limits on 
the unicameral legislature’s power: Specifically, allowing a single 
member to effectively filibuster by delaying a matter involving city 
 
 105. DRAKE & HOLSWORTH, supra note 103, at 39. For a biography of Hill, an important civil rights 
leader, see Oliver W. Hill Building Dedication, VA. DEP’T GEN. SERVS. (Oct. 28, 2005), 
https://www.dhr.virginia.gov/registers/Cities/Richmond/127-6048_FinanceBuilding_2008_NR_ 
final.pdf.  
 106. Atlanta’s City Council had been bicameral since the city’s incorporation in 1847.  
A Chronology of the History of Atlanta, 1782-2010, ATLANTA CITY COUNCIL, http://citycouncil.atl 
antaga.gov/historynew.htm (last updated Apr. 17, 2003).  
 107. See Hoke Smith May, Plan Adds 100,000 Population, 82 Sq. Miles to Atlanta Proper, 
ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 12, 1951, at 24; see also Cleghorn Reese, What’s Happened in Year Under 
Atlanta-Fulton ‘Plan of Improvement,’ ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 28, 1952, at 1D; Herman Hancock, 
Stronger Hand for Hartsfield Seen in City Council Shakeup, ATLANTA CONST., Dec 13, 1953, at 2C. 
Thus, while this Article primarily identifies unicameralism with antigrowth or NIMBY sentiments in 
the suburbs, see infra Part II.B, here, unicameralism is associated with the so-called “growth machine” 
of urban development (or the related “regime theory” originally developed to describe Atlanta itself). 
See David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of the Field from the Field, 21 J.L. 
& POL. 261, 266 n.13 (2005) (describing theories). 
 108. Herman Hancock, Other Cities Study Plan Improvement: Atlanta Sets Pattern, ATLANTA 
CONST., July 26, 1953, at 4C.  
 109. Reduction in Council And Number of Wards To Face Senate Today: Millican Bill Is Assailed 
By Aldermen, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 5, 1952, at 1.  
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finances for one meeting.110 Other opponents relied on tradition itself, 
arguing that divided government was the most familiar, or even the most 
American, form of legislative structure.111 At the most mundane level, 
legislators argued that the bicameral structure simply provided more 
seats for legislators, improving constituent services.112  
These defenses of bicameralism¾checks and balances, tradition, 
and size¾mirror those made across the country. Bicameralism advocates 
everywhere, like the framers of the federal Constitution, saw the system 
as a necessary check against imprudent legislation.113 For opponents of 
unicameralism in conservative Richmond that meant a fear of higher 
taxes,114 but the content could vary.115 In Philadelphia, it was argued that 
the size of a bicameral legislature provided a larger pool of trained 
politicians fit for higher office.116 
Even today, the battle lines remain fixed in place: in Everett, 
Massachusetts, the same arguments arose on each side. Advocates of 
unicameralism saw the old council as “a place of bickering, gridlock, and 
confusion. When you have 18 in one branch and seven in the other, 
there’s no consensus.”117 Financial savings played a significant role, with 
Everett Mayor Carlo DeMaria citing the councilors’ salaries and health 
premiums as major expenses worth eliminating.118 The same 
modernizing rhetoric was deployed: “[i]t’s time to bring Everett into the 
21st century,” said the Chairman of the Charter Revision Commission.119 
“It’s time to have a more efficient, more accountable, more 
straightforward form of government.”120 
 
 110. Gilliam White & Raleigh Bryans, Irked Councilmen To Seek ‘Rights’ in Home Rule, ATLANTA 
CONST., Feb. 17, 1952, at 10B. 
 111. Id. (“Some council members resent the change—even though the present bicameral system 
has been virtually inoperative for years¾for the sake of sentiment and continuity.”); Hoke Smith May, 
Solon Views Atlanta Plan as Red ‘Plot,’ ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 6, 1951, at 1 (quoting the Chairman of 
the Georgia House Municipal Government Committee, who described the Plan of Improvement as “a 
typical Communist plot to consolidate government.”). 
 112. Reduction in Council And Number of Wards To Face Senate Today: Millican Bill Is Assailed 
By Aldermen, supra note 109, at 1 (“Councilman Jesse Draper objected to any reduction in council’s 
membership, and said the duties of the office are now arduous because of the demand made by 
constituents.”). 
 113. KIMBALL, supra note 72, at 411.  
 114. JEFFRIES, JR., supra note 102, at 124.  
 115. The Seattle Charter Will Soon Be Submitted to the People. City Officers All Elective, 
OREGONIAN, July 18, 1890, at 2 (describing Seattle’s 1890 charter, which included a bicameral 
legislature, as “very stringent and the object has been to place the strongest possible safeguard around 
the public treasury”).  
 116. Woodruff, supra note 79, at 316.  
 117. Rosenberg, supra note 7.  
 118. Rosenberg, supra note 7.  
 119. John Laidler, New Effort to Downsize Government, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 6, 2011), 
http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2011/03/06/in_everett_a_new_effort_to_streamli
ne_government/. 
 120. Id.  
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Defenders of the old, bicameral legislature, like those that came 
before them, emphasized the importance of checks and balances, the 
value of tradition¾especially the conventional understanding of 
bicameralism as a crowning achievement of American constitutionalism 
and the benefits of a larger legislature. “Why would you fix something 
that is not broken?” asked one member of the Everett Common 
Council.121 “I thought it was the best form of government. You had checks 
and balances.”122 The President of the Board of Aldermen highlighted the 
additional access that citizens had to their officials with two overlapping 
legislative bodies.123 Another Everett Alderman, like Philadelphians 
before him, asked where Everett would find its mayors without a 
bicameral city council serving as a farm system.124 Everett weighed the 
same arguments as American cities have for centuries and then, finally, 
abandoned ship on bicameralism.  
What unicameralism and bicameralism have been understood to 
offer local governments has remained remarkably constant for 150 years 
and in every case, unicameralism has won out. Legislators and voters, 
then and now, see local government as in need of modernization, not 
bound to tradition, and chafe at local government’s inefficiencies without 
fearing an unchecked single chamber. They see bicameralism as so 
useless at the local level that it is not worth even paying the salaries of a 
second set of councilmen. Local government was consciously designed 
and adapted to embody a particular set of values and not the values of the 
federal Constitution.  
B. UNICAMERALISM IN SUBURBIA 
So far, this history has focused on large cities. Urban centers 
embraced bicameralism early on, and their transition from one 
legislative structure to another shows the contingency and conflicts that 
marked the adoption of unicameralism. These transitions are where the 
values behind local unicameralism are made most visible. In contrast, 
unicameralism has always been firmly entrenched in the suburbs. 
In suburbs, as compared to cities, government structure is more 
often set forth by generally applicable statutes. Larger cities tend to be 
governed by customizable charters, where drafters write on a blank slate 
and generally could have the choice to adopt bicameralism.125 In contrast, 
 
 121. Rosenberg, supra note 7. 
 122. Rosenberg, supra note 7.  
 123. Rosenberg, supra note 7.  
 124. Independent Staff, Everett Charter Commission Holds Public Hearing on Restructuring of 
City Government, EVERETT INDEP. (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.everettindependent.com/2011/ 
04/06/everett-charter-commission-holds-public-hearing-on-restructuring-of-city-government/.  
 125. Cf. Christopher J. Tyson, Municipal Identity as Property, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 647, 661 (2014) 
(connecting liberalized municipal incorporation laws with “an explosion in the number, size, and 
character of suburban municipalities” outside historic urban centers).  
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smaller local governments instead use “off-the-rack” governmental 
forms set by the states.126 State incorporation statutes generally do not 
provide for bicameralism.  
For example, in Massachusetts¾where heated debate over the 
structure of Boston’s city council implicated issues of ethnicity, religion, 
corruption, and good government,127 and where Everett remained 
resolutely bicameral until just a few years ago¾the general incorporation 
statute offers no option for bicameralism. It provides six different plans 
for cities to choose between, each of which is unicameral.128 The 
Massachusetts menu of options is not limited to unicameralism out of a 
fear of difference. One option provides for proportional 
representation,129 a fairly exotic electoral structure in this country.130 But 
to the Massachusetts legislature, even proportional representation is 
more appropriate for local governments than bicameralism¾no matter 
the latter’s constitutional pedigree.  
Massachusetts is not alone in denying bicameralism as an option in 
its general municipal incorporation statutes. California, for example, 
offers choices between strong and weak mayoral systems, between 
district-based and at-large council elections, and between numbers of 
council districts, but all within a unicameral framework.131 Texas requires 
its general law municipalities to be unicameral, although they may 
choose between a city council, a Board of Aldermen, a Board of 
Commissioners, and a city manager-type system, each with its own 
structure.132 Moreover, under the Texas Constitution, small 
municipalities are required to be incorporated under general law, not by 
custom charter, meaning there is no chance to develop their own 
 
 126. Id.  
 127. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.  
 128. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 1 (2018) (defining Plans A–F); § 2 (requiring choice of Plan); §§ 50, 
59, 67, 82, 96 (providing additional detail on Plans). To be precise, these Plans are available to 
municipalities defined as “cities” and not “towns” under state law, which tends to mean mid-size 
municipalities. See MASS. CONST. art. LXXXI, § 2 (limiting city forms of government to municipalities 
of 12,000 or more residents). Towns have a separate set of unicameral local governments they may 
choose, growing out of the town meeting tradition. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43A (2018). 
 129. MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 96 (2018). This option exists for the benefit of Cambridge, which 
uses a proportional system. McSweeney v. City of Cambridge, 665 N.E.2d 11 (Mass. 1996). 
 130. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of 
Proportional Representation: Why Won’t It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257 (1985); Lani Guinier, 
Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. 
REV. 1589, 1594–95 (1993) (suggesting proportional representation replace “current doctrinal 
approaches”).  
 131. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 34871 (West 2017); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 36801, 36802, 36810 
(each describing the meetings of “the city council” in a manner which necessarily implies a unicameral 
city council).  
 132. See TEX. MUN. LEAGUE, 2015 HANDBOOK FOR MAYORS AND COUNCILMEMBERS ch. 1 (2015), 
http://www.tml.org/Handbook-M&C/Chapter1.pdf (summarizing Texas incorporation law).  
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(potentially bicameral) model.133 New York’s Town Law,134 Second Class 
Cities Law,135 and Village Law136 each provide for unicameral structures 
for the forms of local government they regulate. While large, chartered 
cities have chosen unicameralism,137 small general-law municipalities 
have unicameralism chosen for them.  
Bicameralism does not appear to have had any significant presence 
in suburban governance. While two-chambered legislatures were once 
common in city governments, small towns and bedroom communities 
have always been exclusively unicameral. Whatever forces drive local 
governments towards unicameralism, they are stronger in the suburbs.  
C. AN ANOMALY: NEW YORK CITY 
One anomalous case bears separate mention: New York City. New 
York is often an outlier in local government law,138 and its path to 
unicameralism is distinct from that of other cities. First, New York is the 
rare (perhaps unique¾I can find no other) city that has moved from 
bicameralism to unicameralism and back again. Prior to consolidation, 
New York (then limited to Manhattan) created a bicameral legislature in 
1830 and moved to unicameralism in the “Reform Charter” of 1873.139 
After the consolidation of the five boroughs, New York briefly used a 
bicameral system, likely to reflect the independent political identities of 
the boroughs.140 A unicameral city council was reinstated nearly 
immediately in 1901 due to concerns about bicameralism “snarling” city 
government.141 New York flipped back to bicameralism between 1924 and 
1936 and has stayed unicameral since.142 But even since then, New York 
 
 133. TEXAS CONST., art. 11, § 4.  
 134. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 20(1) (West 2014). 
 135. N.Y. SECOND CLASS CITIES LAW § 31 (West 2017). 
 136. N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF LOCAL GOV. SERVS., LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK 70 (6th ed. 
2011), https://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/Local_Government_Handbook.pdf (citing N.Y. 
VILLAGE LAW art. 2).  
 137. Not in all instances, of course: state legislation has been the path to unicameralism for many 
large cities. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 75.  
 138. See, e.g., Jon C. Teaford, The Birth of a Public Corporation, 1730-1870, 83 MICH. L. REV. 690, 
701 (1985) (reviewing HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW (1983)) (“New York City was an unusual case both before and 
after the Revolution.”); Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
953, 968 (1967) (“To regard the government of New York as a local government is to make nonsense 
of the term.”). 
 139. Edward T. O’Donnell & Alex Poole, Changes to the City Charter, 1653–2008, in THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK 230–31 (Kenneth T. Jackson, ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
 140. See id. at 232; see also James W. Lowe, Examination of Governmental Decentralization in 
New York City and A New Model for Implementation, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173 (1990) (describing 
history of New York legislature). 
 141. O’Donnell & Poole, supra note 139, at 232; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. & Eric Lane, The 
Policy and Politics of Charter Making: The Story of New York City’s 1989 Charter, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 775, 783–86 (1998). 
 142. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 784.  
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has more than once seriously considered returning to a bicameral City 
Council, unlike other American cities.143 
Second, through most of the 20th century, New York’s unicameral 
legislature played second fiddle to a quasi-legislative entity, the Board of 
Estimate, with which it shared certain powers. The City Council (or Board 
of Aldermen, depending on the styling of the time) formally held the 
legislative power of New York City.144 But the Council exercised little 
power in practice. In their authoritative description of mid-century New 
York politics, Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman described the City 
Council’s record as “an abundance of trifles”145 and archly noted that 
“[t]he Council has disappointed even its least hopeful members.”146 One 
City Council member joked that the Council “was not even a rubber 
stamp because ‘a rubber stamp leaves an impression.”147  
Instead, the Board of Estimate exercised much of what might be 
considered legislative power. The Board of Estimate shared lawmaking 
power with the Council on taxation levels and charter revision, had a 
dominant role in the budget process compared to the Council, and had 
sole authority over city planning and zoning, control of city property and 
city personnel, and the granting of franchises.148  
But while sometimes compared to the upper chamber of a 
legislature,149 the Board of Estimate was not a legislature. The Board was 
not independently elected, but rather was a “caucus of officials, acting ex 
officio as members of the Board of Estimate.”150 It generally lacked broad 
policymaking power; with the exception of the budget, its authority 
generally focused on narrower case-by-case determinations.151 Its 
 
 143. See infra notes 154-158 (discussing debates during 1989 charter revisions); see also Hal 
Hazelrigg, Charter Hopes Mount in City, Despite Curbs, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., May 6, 1934, at A1 
(describing proposal by former governor Al Smith to create new bicameral New York City legislature 
“similar to the State Legislature”).  
 144. WALLACE S. SAYRE & HERBERT KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY: POLITICS IN THE 
METROPOLIS 607 (1960). The city charter provided that “[t]he council shall be vested with the 
legislative power of the city, and shall be the local legislative body of the city, with the sole power to 
adopt local laws.” Id.  
 145. Id. at 611. 
 146. Id. at 652.  
 147. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 781.  
 148. SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 144, at 627–28.  
 149. See, e.g., Michael A. Cardozo, Reflections on the 1989 Charter Revisions, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 85, 90 (2013-2014) (“The 1989 Commission replaced bicameral approval of the budget by the 
Board of Estimate and Council, with unicameral approval by the Council alone.”). 
 150. SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 144, at 650 (“[W]hile the Board exercises many of the powers 
of a legislature, it does not function like one.”); see also Todd S. Purdum, A 2-House Legislature for 
New York City?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/20/nyregion/ 
a-2-house-legislature-for-new-york-city.html (noting that the Board of Estimate, although quasi-
legislative, “does not have the size or structure or committees of a legislature”). 
 151. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 771–72 (The Board of Estimate “lacked the broad 
legislative authority needed to promote and effectuate policies different from a mayor’s. . . . The 
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functions were as much executive as legislative. The President, after all, 
has roles in the legislative process similar to those of the Board of 
Estimate: the constitutional power to veto and, by statute, the first step 
in the budget process.152 Imprecise analogies notwithstanding, New York 
fell into its own category of legislative structure: not truly bicameral, for 
the Board of Estimate was its own entity entirely, but with some of the 
features of bicameralism and evidencing a greater comfort with multiple 
entities coexisting in the legislative sphere.  
As a result of these differences, the final move to full unicameralism 
looked somewhat different in New York City than elsewhere. In 1989, in 
the wake of a Supreme Court decision holding the Board of Estimate 
unconstitutional, New York embarked on a major charter reform.153 The 
charter reform commission seriously considered whether a bicameral 
Council should replace the Council-plus-Board structure.154 New York 
worked through familiar arguments for and against unicameralism. The 
charter commission saw bicameralism as promoting a “more disciplined 
and deliberative regimen” and avoiding “precipitous legislative 
action.”155 Bicameralism was also touted as a way to double the 
opportunities for citizen participation, to elevate the city’s status to 
something more akin to a state government, and simply to preserve the 
status quo.156 Unicameralists argued that a single chambered-legislature 
would be more powerful and effective, touted the city as distinct from the 
state¾“[s]lavish adherence to the state model may not be appropriate,” 
noted then-Bronx Borough President Fernando Ferrer¾and once again 
flagged the issue, hardly of constitutional import, of a second set of 
salaries.157 Ultimately, however, bicameralism was rejected because the 
bicameral proposals under consideration would have diminished the 
political power of racial minorities.158 Still, although New York has ended 
up with the same legislative structure as all other local governments¾a 
 
members strike bargains on homeless shelters, for example, but never consider how to solve 
homelessness.”).  
 152. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-44, § 201–1-17, 
88 Stat. 297 (1974).  
 153. Bd. of Estimate of City of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989). 
 154. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 778–79; see also Purdum, supra note 150 (describing 
bicameralism debates as “perhaps the most contentious question” addressed by Charter Revision 
Committee).  
 155. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 786.  
 156. Purdum, supra note 150. Another argument for bicameralism¾which unsurprisingly failed 
to carry the day¾was that it allows for “pass[ing] the buck” between the two chambers. Purdum, supra 
note 150. 
 157. Purdum, supra note 150. 
 158. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 786, 813; see also Todd S. Purdum, Black and 
Hispanic Officials Are Cool to 2-House Plan, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1989/05/01/nyregion/black-and-hispanic-officials-are-cool-to-2-house-plan.html.  
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stand-alone City Council¾it consistently showed a greater inclination 
towards bicameralism.  
There are many reasons why New York might have leaned more 
toward bicameralism. New York was formed out of the merger of two 
large, independent cities and various smaller towns: Like the states 
represented in the Senate, a demand for independent representation of 
these original political subdivisions, as subdivisions, remains.159 New 
York is also simply larger than any other American city. The city has a 
larger population than 40 out of 50 states,160 and its budget is larger than 
those of every state but California, Texas, Florida, and New York State.161 
In terms of size and capacity, New York is more akin to a state than most 
other local governments, and may, like states, have more need for 
bicameralism. New York’s size also makes New York particularly diverse, 
generating demand for more forms of representation. Whatever the 
reasons, New York is an unusual example of unicameralism. It bolsters 
the fact of uniform local unicameralism: even New York City has fully 
adopted it. But in many ways, it is the exception that proves the rule, the 
outlier that keeps flirting with bicameralism. 
D. A HISTORY OF STATE BICAMERALISM 
At the national level, bicameralism is firmly entrenched¾given 
special protections by the federal constitution and afforded special 
normative value by the Framers and contemporary scholars¾and not the 
subject of any meaningful amendment efforts. In contrast, local 
governments have uniformly moved towards unicameralism, embracing 
efficiency as the highest value for a legislative structure and minimizing 
the importance of both tradition and checks and balances. Examining the 
intermediate level of state government helps make sense of this divide. 
The states are overwhelmingly bicameral: Only Nebraska has adopted a 
unicameral legislature.162 Yet unlike the national government, Article V 
 
 159. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 786 (“For some members of the Commission . . . the 
small upper house was initially seen as an opportunity to give a legislative role to borough 
presidents.”); see also Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: 
The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 775, 816 (1992) (“Morris makes it much more difficult for a state to require, or for a 
city to provide, special representation for a distinctive territorial subunit within the city.”). 
 160. New York City Population, N.Y.C. DEP’T CITY PLANNING, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/plan 
ning/data-maps/nyc-population/population-facts.page (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). 
 161. FISCAL POL’Y INST., NEW YORK CITY TAXES¾TRENDS, IMPACT AND PRIORITIES FOR REFORM  
1 (2015), http://fiscalpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/NYC-Tax-Report-Summary.pdf. 
 162. Additionally, Washington, D.C. has a unicameral government that in certain ways is better 
analogized to a state than a city. See Johnny Barnes, Towards Equal Footing: Responding to the 
Perceived Constitutional, Legal and Practical Impediments to Statehood for the District of Columbia, 
13 U.D.C. L. REV. 1, 20 (2010) (cataloguing examples of Congress or the courts treating D.C. as a state). 
But D.C. is run by a “mayor” and its home rule act describes itself as a “charter for local government.” 
Pub. L. 93–198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973). Regardless, Washington is an anomalous case. Unlike either cities 
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and other legacies of the constitutional convention cannot explain their 
bicameralism. State constitutions are changed more frequently and more 
thoroughly than the federal constitution.  
This Part shows how the divergent choices of legislative structure by 
state and local governments cast into sharper contrast the purposes and 
nature of local government itself. While states are seen as dual sovereigns 
with the national government163¾fundamentally similar and therefore 
requiring basically similar legislatures¾local governments are not 
understood as simply another, still smaller, level of government. While 
state government, like the national government, is seen as requiring 
constraint, local government is empowered. While state government, like 
the national government, has its structure infused with cultural meaning, 
not to be discarded lightly, local government is seen as a tool to be freely 
adapted to the needs of the moment. Citizens and politicians want states 
to look like the federal government, but they impose no such requirement 
on local governments.  
In the Revolutionary period, the form of state legislative power was 
contested, and the eventual dominance of bicameralism was not a 
foregone conclusion. The two most influential early state constitutions 
were those of Massachusetts, enacted in 1780, and of Pennsylvania, from 
1776.164 The former represented a more conservative approach to 
constitutionalism, marked by checks and balances between the branches; 
the latter a more radical alternative marked by “ultrademocratic” 
legislative supremacy.165 The Massachusetts model is familiar¾it 
inspired the federal constitution.166 Pennsylvania, in contrast, adopted a 
structure much more similar to today’s local governments than to today’s 
federal government. Pennsylvania adopted a unicameral legislature with 
a weak executive and weak judiciary.167  
Although unfamiliar to us today as a model for state government, 
Pennsylvania’s embrace of unicameralism¾and its identification of 
unicameralism with democracy and the recent revolution¾had a 
distinguished intellectual legacy. Thomas Paine’s Common Sense called 
 
or states, it is subject to direct Congressional control and falls outside the bounds of normal local 
government law. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 163. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution 
establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government.”). 
 164. Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania’s Radical 
1776 Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 541, 546 
(1989).  
 165. Id. at 554. 
 166. Id. at 541–42 (quoting John Adams’ declaration “I made a Constitution for Massachusetts, 
which finally made the Constitution of the United States.”). 
 167. Id. at 556. Other limits on governmental power included one-year terms and restrictive term 
limits, as well as requirements that bills be passed in successive legislative terms. Id. at 557.  
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for establishing unicameral legislatures.168 Benjamin Franklin, too, 
supported unicameralism in the states, and his influence was strongly felt 
in his home state.169 Nor did Pennsylvania stand alone in its 
constitutional structure. Vermont and Georgia each employed 
unicameral legislatures during the early republic,170 and other states 
seriously considered the idea.171 
The theories behind early unicameralism are particularly relevant 
for understanding the more widespread adoption of unicameralism at 
the local level. Some of Pennsylvania’s democrats, like their opponents, 
understood the risks of concentrating power in a single branch made of 
a single chamber.172 Their solution, however, relied on “bicameralism 
from below.”173 They expected additional popular participation to check 
the legislature, rather than a second elite branch to do the same.174 
Alternatively, some believed, following the Whig ideology of the time, 
that societies were fundamentally homogeneous, and that “the people” 
shared a basic set of interests which their legislature could represent.175 
Under this theory, limits on government power or efficacy could only 
hamper the state’s ability to do the people’s work (or introduce 
aristocratic distortions). As historian Gordon Wood phrased it, “a 
tyranny by the people was theoretically inconceivable.”176 Thus, either of 
two arguably interconnected conditions could be seen as justifying 
unicameralism: strong institutions of public participation allowing for 
direct control and discipline of the legislature or a homogeneous citizenry 
 
 168. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 96 (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Classics 1986) (1776) (“LET 
the assemblies be annual, with a President only. The representation more equal. Their business wholly 
domestic, and subject to the authority of a Continental Congress.”); see also Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The 
Revolutionary Portfolio: Constitution-Making and the Wider World in the American Revolution, 47 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 759, 783 (2014) (“Thomas Paine, in Common Sense, suggested that in governments 
based on popular sovereignty, all power should reside in a unicameral legislature.”). 
 169. Williams, supra note 164, at 577 (James Madison, recalling the constitutional convention, 
noted that only the Pennsylvania delegation dissented from the decision to adopt a bicameral 
Congress, “probably from complaisance to Docr. Franklin who was understood to be partial to a single 
House of Legislation.”). Williams, supra note 164, at 577 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 25, at 48 (statement of James Madison, May 31, 1787)).  
 170. John Dinan, Framing A “People’s Government”: State Constitution-Making in the 
Progressive Era, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 933, 957–58 (1999).  
 171. Williams, supra note 164, at 564 (describing North Carolina’s constitutional convention 
adopting bicameralism only after debate and compromise with more democratic factions); Williams, 
supra note 164, at 585 n.229 (the famous Shays Rebellion in Massachusetts advocated for an end to 
the Massachusetts Senate and the imposition of unicameralism).  
 172. Williams, supra note 164, at 558. 
 173. Williams, supra note 164, at 565 (quoting STAUGHTON LYND, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN RADICALISM 171 (1968)).  
 174. Williams, supra note 164, at 558 (“[C]heck it from below¾with more democracy¾rather than 
from above, with less.”) (quoting Jesse Lemisch, The American Revolution Seen from the Bottom Up, 
in TOWARDS A NEW PAST: DISSENTING ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 14–15 (Barton Bernstein ed., 
1968)). 
 175. Williams, supra note 164, at 581. 
 176. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 62 (1969).  
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with shared interests. Both these conditions exist at the local level to a far 
greater degree than at higher levels of government, as will be discussed 
later.  
Of course, these early experiments with unicameralism at the state 
level did not last. Prominent constitutional thinkers of the time argued 
vociferously against unicameralism. In his influential 1776 essay 
“Thoughts on Government,” John Adams painted single-chambered 
legislatures¾whether possessed of full parliamentary power or sharing 
authority with an executive and judicial branch¾as “apt to be 
avaricious,” “apt to grow ambitious,” “liable to all the vices, follies, and 
frailties of an individual,” and “subject to fits of humor, starts of passion, 
flights of enthusiasm, partialities, or prejudice¾and consequently 
productive of hasty results and absurd judgments.”177 Adams won the 
day, not only at the national level, but also eventually among all the early 
states. Georgia switched to bicameralism in 1789, Pennsylvania in 1790, 
and Vermont in 1836.178 Even so, the ideological debate of the founding 
era illuminates the ultimate divergence of state and local legislative 
structure. 
The states began to reconsider their choice of legislative structure in 
the Progressive Era. During the early 20th century, many Progressives 
came to believe that existing forms of government were creaky, 
inefficient, and often corrupt.179 Government reform took many 
shapes¾at the state level, the introduction of the initiative and 
referendum may have been the most obvious constitutional 
amendments180¾and a reconsideration of bicameralism was one. 
Progressives hoped to make local governments more businesslike, and 
corporations are generally unicameral.181 Bicameralism was also seen as 
one of many structural features permitting conservative interests to block 
legislation like minimum wage statutes or workers’ compensation, and 
therefore an impediment to a truer form of democracy.182 As California 
Governor Hiram Johnson put it, describing his own set of institutional 
 
 177. John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS  
87 (George A. Peek, Jr. ed., Hackett Publ. 2003) (1776).  
 178. G. ALAN TARR, BICAMERALISM OR UNICAMERALISM?, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE MAJORITY POLICY 
COMMITTEE, PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE 2 (2010), https://statecon.camden.rutgers.edu/sites/ 
statecon/files/publications/bicameralism.pdf.  
 179. See supra note 76 and accompanying text discussing progressive ideology.  
 180. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1512 (1990) 
(“Direct democracy, the conventional history tells us, was a response of the Progressive Reform 
movement to the widely perceived corruption and control of legislatures by corporate wealth.”).  
 181. See Schleicher, supra note 19, at 465 (on Progressive analogy of governments to business); 
Levmore, supra note 44, at 162 (noting that corporate boards are generally unicameral).  
 182. Dinan, supra note 170, at 958–59 (“Whereas bicameralism had originally been viewed as a 
guarantee of legislative deliberation, on the ground that it permitted a refinement of the public views, 
a number of convention delegates began to conclude that this arrangement did more to thwart than to 
secure the public interest.”). 
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reforms (not including unicameralism), “[t]he historic system of checks 
and balances guarded against the old danger of governmental aggression, 
but not sufficiently against the new danger of [private] aggression . . . we 
found it necessary that the system of checks and balances that some view 
with such idolatry and with such pride, should be eliminated in our 
constitution.”183  
In Massachusetts, the state that paved the way for bicameralism at 
the founding, the constitutional convention of 1917-1919 debated both an 
outright move to unicameralism and a proposal to give the lower house 
the power to override the state Senate.184 Constitutional conventions in 
Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Ohio also debated unicameralism seriously.185 
Governors proposed unicameralism in Arizona, California, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Washington, and South Dakota.186 Unicameralism received 
fifty-eight percent of the vote in an Oklahoma referendum but was not 
enacted due to the large number of abstentions denying unicameralism 
an outright majority of votes cast.187  
In Arizona, the state Senate passed a bill eliminating its own 
chamber in 1912, although the bill died in the House.188 The bill’s chief 
sponsor, Senator Worsley, argued for a form of “bicameralism from 
below,” familiar from debates a century earlier. He pointed to the new 
powers of initiative, referendum and recall as providing the citizens 
themselves with all the power of a second legislative body.189 The 
opposition focused on the importance of tradition and the dignity of 
bicameralism with the federal government and all Arizona’s sister states. 
“This system of government was thought best by the men who framed 
our national constitution . . . that sacred document,”190 editorialized one 
major newspaper. Another newspaper claimed that unicameralism 
would “make Arizona the laughing stock of her neighbors or a scarecrow 
for capital.”191 The modeling of the federal system carried the day over 
the call for more radical democracy in Arizona. 
 
 183. Dinan, supra note 170, at 946–47. 
 184. Dinan, supra note 170, at 960.  
 185. Dinan, supra note 170, at 960. 
 186. Kim Robak, The Nebraska Unicameral and Its Lasting Benefits, 76 NEB. L. REV. 791, 793 n.9 
(1997). 
 187. James R. Rogers, Judicial Review Standards in Unicameral Legislative Systems: A Positive 
Theoretic and Historical Analysis, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 65, 70 (1999). 
 188. Anthony Tsontakis, The Arizona Senate Suicide Attempt of 1912, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 2012, at 
40, 43–46. The House debates were largely satirical, with that body never taking seriously the idea of 
unicameralism. Before voting down the bill, the House passed amendments to permanently 
disenfranchise all sitting Senators, to move the state capital to the state penitentiary, and to redraft 
the bill in the form of poetry rather than legislative language. Id. at 44–46.  
 189. Id. at 41.  
 190. Id. at 43.  
 191. Id. at 44.  
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Only one state enacted unicameralism in the early 20th century: 
Nebraska, in a 1934 referendum. Senator George Norris, the leading 
advocate for unicameralism, believed that the two-house system was a 
relic of the English class system, with its Commons and Lords, and 
inappropriate for a fully democratic and ostensibly class-free American 
society.192 He also believed that bicameralism introduced a secretive and 
unaccountable step in the legislative process when the two chambers met 
in conference to resolve their differences, that efficient businesslike 
operations demanded unicameralism (no corporation would have two 
boards of directors) and that having two chambers was, if nothing else, 
costly and wasteful.193 The opposition once again cited tradition, calling 
the plan “un-American,” and argued that a unicameral legislature would 
pass too much legislation.194 The passage of the plan sparked renewed 
interest in unicameralism¾12 state legislatures considered 
unicameralism in 1935 and 21 legislatures did so in 1937¾but only 
Nebraska adopted it.195 To this day, Nebraskans mark their Unicameral 
a point of pride. They considered placing it on their state quarter196 and 
leading politicians describe it in the same breath as college football and 
as having an “almost mystical quality.”197 Nebraskans see their 
legislature, like “[c]ity councils and county and school boards,” as a way 
to provide deliberation without a “redundancy that slows the process,” 
and as adequately checked by the governor.198 State reports have also 
touted the direct cost savings from paying fewer legislators.199 
The states continue to debate the merits of unicameralism 
periodically. Alaska seriously considered unicameralism in its 1956 
constitutional convention, but it was concerned with how 
Congress¾then debating Alaskan statehood¾would view its “political 
maturity.”200 A two-house legislature was seen as more familiar to 
 
 192. Robak, supra note 186, at 795–96. But see Rogers, supra note 187, at 76–77 (noting that 
historically, American bicameralism did not have its roots in the British class system but was rather 
“thoroughly republicanized”). 
 193. Robak, supra note 186, at 795–97.  
 194. Robak, supra note 186, at 799. 
 195. Rogers, supra note 187, at 72.  
 196. Jonathan S. Ross, A New Answer for an Old Question: Should Alaska Once Again Consider 
A Unicameral Legislature?, 27 ALASKA L. REV. 257, 279 (2010) (citing Scott Bauer, Heineman to 
Receive Final State Quarter Designs Next Week, LINCOLN JOURNAL-STAR, Apr. 26, 2005, at 1). 
 197. Robak, supra note 186, at 791–92.  
 198. Robak, supra note 186, 807–08, 816.  
 199. Ross, supra note 196, at 277 (citing Roger V. Shumate, The Nebraska Unicameral 
Legislature, 5 W. POL. Q. 504, 506 (1952)).  
 200. Michael Schwaiger, Understanding the Unoriginal: Indeterminant Originalism and 
Independent Interpretation of the Alaska Constitution, 22 ALASKA L. REV. 293, 310 (2005) (quoting 
Gerald A. McBeath & Thomas A. Morehousoe, ALASKA POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 121 (1994)); see also 
Ross, supra note 196, at 258.  
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Congress, more “ordinary,” and was ultimately adopted.201 At least 
fourteen states considered unicameralism in the 1990s.202 California’s 
Constitution Revision Commission, for example, recommended 
unicameralism in 1995, although it later reversed itself.203 Yet 
bicameralism remains firmly entrenched as the legislative form for forty-
nine states.204 
This history of bicameralism offers important insights into local 
government’s contrasting unicameralism. First, the states show that 
bicameralism is not merely a relic of the founding, locked into place by 
the strictures of Article V. States chose bicameralism just as local 
governments chose unicameralism. In some sense, federal bicameralism 
needs no explanation. It exists for principled reasons, as described in the 
introduction, but it also reflects a brute political compromise between 
large and small states. Turning to unicameralism would still require 
either large or small states to lose their influence, depending on which 
chamber was retained, and as such it is nearly impossible to imagine how 
the votes for such an amendment could be mustered.  
In contrast, state constitutions are sites of constant and deep 
change. “State constitutional amendments are frequent, if not 
routine.”205 One analysis of state constitutional amendments from 1999 
counted over 230 state conventions and over 6000 amendments to state 
constitutions.206 In some states, the amendment process is particularly 
easy or common. In Colorado, for example, it is no more difficult to enact 
a constitutional amendment by initiative than it is to enact a statute, and 
the result has been more than 150 amendments over a period of 138 
years.207 Alabama has the world’s longest constitution, inflated in size by 
 
 201. Ross, supra note 196, at 258. Early advocates of Alaskan unicameralism felt that Congress 
was too “bound by tradition” and unappreciative of “experimental democracy.” Ross, supra note 196, 
at 260 (citing JEANETTE P. NICHOLS, ALASKA: A HISTORY OF ITS ADMINISTRATION, EXPLOITATION, AND 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT DURING ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY UNDER THE RULE OF THE UNITED STATES 
403 (1923)).  
 202. Rogers, supra note 187, at 73–74.  
 203. Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the Past? The Increasing 
Role of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1 HOFSTRA L. POL’Y SYMP. 1, 18 
n.69 (1996); Rogers, supra note 187, at 74. 
 204. For additional accounts of states considering unicameralism, see Dan Friedman, Magnificent 
Failure Revisited: Modern Maryland Constitutional Law from 1967 to 1998, 58 MD. L. REV. 528, 549 
n.115 (1999) (a Maryland commission deciding against a “modern” unicameral model by a single vote); 
Fritz Snyder, Montana’s Top Document: Its Transition into the 21st Century, MONT. LAW, Aug./Sept. 
2009, at 8. 
 205. Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalism and the Domain of Normative Theory, 37 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 523, 528 (2000).  
 206. Dinan, supra note 170, at 935 (citing G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Politics: An Historical 
Perspective, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND 
HISTORICAL PATTERNS 3 (1996)). 
 207. Jim Griesemer, Colorado Should Say “No” to Constitutional Amendments, DENVER POST 
(Oct. 24, 2014, 10:38 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2014/10/24/colorado-should-say-no-to-
constitutional-amendments/.  
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890 amendments as of 2015.208 Unlike federal constitutionalism, a 
resistance to formal amendment does not mark state 
constitutionalism.209  
Since no procedural obstacle to unicameralism exists at the state 
level, in the form of either general hurdles to constitutional amendment 
or special protections for bicameralism,210 there must instead be a 
substantive distinction drawn between states and localities.211 A choice 
has been made to treat the two levels of government differently, a choice 
which must reflect something about each. As a delegate to Massachusetts’ 
Progressive Era constitutional convention put it, in rejecting the 
relevance of local unicameral structures to the state’s own system, “[a] 
city government is not a Legislature.”212 
Second, the debates over state legislative structure essentially 
marshalled the same arguments as those over local legislative structure. 
Efficiency and democracy were laid against tradition, the federal analogy, 
and the importance of checks and balances.213 What differed was the 
weight placed on each of those values. Citizens and legislators, at least 
after the Revolutionary period, worried more about constraining 
potentially oppressive state government and less about unshackling 
states from burdensome supermajority requirements. States also highly 
valued the stature imparted by mirroring the federal structure¾in 
 
 208. Lorelei Laird, Supersized Alabamans Are Readying Yet Another Effort to Reform the State’s 
Famously Long Constitution, ABA J., Mar. 2015, at 12.  
 209. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
549, 590 (2009) (describing difficulty of Article V amendment process and shift to alternative forms 
of constitutional change). 
 210. See Rodriguez, supra note 205, at 528 (identifying state constitutional amendments, unlike 
federal constitutional amendments, as concerning “fundamental” features of government, including 
unicameralism).  
 211. It is notable that this line was drawn differently in the United States than in most other federal 
systems. While most federations have bicameral national legislatures, “unicameralism is increasingly 
the norm in subnational constitutions.” John Dinan, Patterns of Subnational Constitutionalism in 
Federal Countries, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 837, 841 (2008). As of 2001, only  
seventy-three state legislatures across the world were bicameral out of 450, with the long-term trend 
towards subnational unicameralism. Id. at 857 (citing Louis Massicotte, Legislative Unicameralism: 
A Global Survey and a Few Case Studies, 7 J. LEGIS. STUD. 151, 151 (2001)). For example, while five 
Canadian provinces once had bicameral legislatures, none do today, and the last German bicameral 
state, Bavaria, turned to unicameralism in 1998. Dinan, supra, at 858. Many national constitutions 
require subnational bicameralism, while other states have been given the choice and opted for 
bicameralism. Dinan, supra, at 857. Australia is the only other country with largely bicameral state 
government. Dinan, supra, at 859. Perhaps this is so because Australian state constitutions are both 
important symbolic documents (therefore resistant to change) and were originally limited to 
bicameralism due to British legislation. Cheryl Saunders, Australian State Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS 
L.J. 999, 1002, 1011 (2000).  
 212. Dinan, supra note 170, at 962.  
 213. One argument common among proponents of local bicameralism¾the virtue of a larger 
legislature¾was not relevant at the state level, given the generally larger size of state legislative 
chambers.  
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Alaska and Arizona this issue appeared decisive214¾while local 
governments quickly moved away from federally inspired structures. 
Likewise, those who saw their polity, state or local, as sharing 
fundamental interests embraced unicameralism, but as time went on, the 
illusion of homogeneity was easier to maintain at the local level than in 
large states.  
Third, and most importantly, states saw local governments as a form 
apart, different in kind from themselves and the federal government. 
States drew the federal analogy upwards, but they did not extend it 
down¾states neither thought that local governments ought to be 
structured like the federal government nor like themselves. Local 
government was distinct and needed a distinct structure to match. 
Indeed, insofar as it was sometimes state legislatures imposing 
unicameralism on cities directly, it was often the very same entity 
selecting different forms for the two levels of government. In choosing 
bicameralism for themselves and unicameralism for local governments, 
the states determined that local governments should not merely be 
miniature states, but rather take their own shape.  
II.  WHY ARE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNICAMERAL? 
Legislators and voters alike distinguished between state and local 
governments, consistently converging upon bicameral legislatures for 
the former and unicameral legislatures for the latter.215 Any equivalence 
between the two levels of government was rejected. Local governments 
were meant to further different values and given the legislative structure 
to do so effectively. But why?  
Presumably, efficiency, modernization, democratic vigor, and cost 
savings all provide benefits for state government¾all things being 
equal¾and tradition, deliberation, and checks and balances do the same 
at the local level. To understand why local governments adopted 
unicameralism, while states did not, it is necessary to identify features 
shared by all local governments that distinguish them from the states, 
 
 214. See supra notes 188-191, 200-201 and accompanying text.  
 215. James Gardner has identified the convergence of state governments on substantially identical 
structures¾including bicameral legislatures¾as an important and unexplored feature of American 
constitutionalism. James A. Gardner, Autonomy and Isomorphism: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Structural Autonomy in American State Constitutions, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 31, 33–35 (2014). This 
Article makes a similar claim with respect to local constitutional convergence. However, Gardner’s 
conclusions are either inapplicable to local governments (while states might all coordinate around the 
federal model, id. at 44, local governments have not) or unpersuasive in context. Gardner suggests 
that structural convergence stems from easy access to information about standard government 
structures, id. at 65, but this seems to minimize the reasoned debates that occurred over bicameralism, 
the lengthy period of time over which change occurred, and the remaining diversity of local forms on 
issues other than unicameralism. This Part provides its own explanations for the analogous 
convergence of local structures.  
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and which make these particular governmental virtues particularly 
attractive.  
This section examines the features of local government that made 
unchecked majoritarianism so much more appealing at that level. Two 
explanations focus on local government’s position in an 
intergovernmental system: first, the constraints imposed by higher levels 
of government and by interlocal competition, which offer some insurance 
against disastrous government action; and second, the internal 
homogeneity driven by residents who sort themselves into preferred 
towns and cities, which drives demand for swift majoritarianism. The 
executive-focused nature of local government¾which plays a 
proportionally smaller role in regulation and a larger role in 
administration compared to the state and federal 
governments¾provides two other explanations. At the local level, 
unicameralism allows legislatures to more effectively check and balance 
executives. Additionally, local executives have not only greater 
institutional power than local legislatures, but also greater symbolic 
resonance. Local legislatures are more purely instrumental than state 
and federal legislatures, and thus easier to restructure; sentiment and 
tradition do not stand in the way.  
A. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IS CONSTRAINED¾BUT IT ISN’T WEAK 
A tempting explanation for local unicameralism is that local 
governments are weak and in no need of checks and balances.216 
Undoubtedly, this provides part of the explanation. Interlocal 
competition and state oversight217 each help assure residents that, even 
without the brake of a second chamber, their local government cannot do 
too much harm. But local powerlessness cannot be the full story. For 
while these forces limit local government power relative to state or 
national governments, in an absolute sense, local governments retain an 
enormous ability to impose terrible costs on voters. All evidence suggests 
that residents care intensely about the choices of their local governments. 
They do not feel that they can trust either the political marketplace or the 
state legislature to entirely defang local governments. Thus, the legal 
weaknesses of local government provide only the beginnings of an 
explanation for local unicameralism.  
 
 216. See Levmore, supra note 44, at 161 (“The imposition of external costs requires a captive set of 
losers, and these are . . . most difficult to find from the vantage point of City Hall.”).  
 217. Federal oversight also protects against abuses by local government. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2015). However, this is true for state governments and does not explain what leads to a distinctively 
local form of government.  
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The tale of legally helpless local governments has a long scholarly 
lineage.218 On the one hand, many local government law scholars see 
local governments as disempowered by state constitutions, which render 
local governments entirely subordinate to the states219 and confine them 
to delegated powers interpreted narrowly under Dillon’s Rule.220 On the 
other hand, political scientists working in the public choice tradition, 
most famously Paul Peterson, have argued that local government is so 
constrained by interlocal competition that it can only exercise a small 
fraction of the power that it holds.221 In particular, they argue that local 
governments cannot pursue redistributive policies.222 Because citizens 
will move to another town if they are taxed to pay for services that they 
do not receive¾or even for services that they value at less than the bill 
they pay for it¾they claim that it is effectively impossible to sustain any 
policies that do not benefit all taxpaying, mobile residents.223 
Both of these claims have been hotly contested, however, and 
debates over the extent of local power continue with full force.224 I need 
not wade deeply into that debate. Legally, local governments are 
relatively weaker than states¾no one contests this. And each story of 
local powerlessness offers residents at least some reason not to fear their 
local government.  
From the public choice perspective, Tiebout competition (on which 
Peterson’s model is based) offers residents some security from local 
abuse. Charles Tiebout’s famous theory of interlocal competition 
 
 218. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I¾The Structure of Local Government Law,  
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1990) (describing “traditional account of local legal powerlessness”). 
 219. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907): 
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient 
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to 
them . . . the state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may 
take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand 
or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, 
repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or 
unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. 
 220. See, e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 
147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 506–09 (1999); Briffault, supra note 218, at 8; see also GERALD E. FRUG  
& DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 4 (2008); Gerald Frug, The 
City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1109–13 (1980). 
 221. See, e.g., PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981); Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, 
Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2007) (describing 
“conventional wisdom that localities should play little role in fulfilling the redistributive functions of 
government”). 
 222. Gillette, supra note 221, at 1058. 
 223. Gillette, supra note 221, at 1058. 
 224. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the 
Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 489–91 (2009) (describing debate over constraints on city 
power and ultimately arguing that urban areas could show renewed autonomy). See generally Kasim 
Reed, Progressive Cities: Innovative Solutions to Urban Problems, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 219 (2013) 
(arguing for assertive and progressive local government and introducing symposium on that subject). 
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imagines local governments as fighting for residents and firms by selling 
bundles of public services for the “price” of the local tax rate.225 Residents 
and firms, the consumers in the location market, migrate to those 
jurisdictions that best match their preferences for services and taxes.226 
Though the model is highly stylized and in its pure form requires 
implausible assumptions about the mobility of residents and the 
information available to them,227 the Tiebout model captures important 
dynamics shaping local government.228  
In a Tiebout world, interlocal competition serves as a check on local 
power, not an outright bar on its exercise. For example, in a Tiebout 
analysis, cities can (and do)229 pursue redistribution and other policies 
that a rigid Petersonian public choice perspective might suggest are near 
impossible, so long as self-sorted residents are willing to pay for those 
policies. More importantly, there are many limits to Tiebout 
competition’s disciplining power. Those without the wherewithal to 
relocate¾people of color facing residential discrimination, for example, 
or low-income people who cannot afford the up-front costs of moving, 
expensive suburban housing, or an automobile necessary to leave a 
center city¾cannot impose “market” discipline on their local 
governments.230 Likewise, those whose tax payments are less than their 
service consumption, and who therefore impose a fiscal cost on local 
governments, are undesirable from a fiscal perspective; local 
governments may actively avoid satisfying their preferences.231 Without 
the power to vote with their feet, these groups are inadequately protected 
by Tiebout competition.  
Even so, Tiebout competition checks at least certain exercises of 
local power and therefore arguably makes intra-legislative checks and 
balances less important. Residents can check their local legislatures not 
only by voting for and lobbying the members of a second chamber but 
also by voting with their feet¾or credibly threatening to do so. That 
 
 225. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 422 (1956). 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. at 419 (listing assumptions); Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 
71 AM. ECON. REV. 93, 93 (1981) (“The pure [Tiebout] model, however, involves a set of assumptions 
so patently unrealistic as to verge on the outrageous.”). 
 228. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 511–28 (1991) (observing empirical 
evidence that jurisdictions in fact compete for residents with service/tax packages); David Schleicher, 
The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1508 (2010) (observing empirical 
evidence that local policies are “capitalized” into housing prices).  
 229. CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND 
THE COURTS xi (2011). 
 230. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II¾Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
346, 420–21 (1990) (describing barriers to mobility).  
 231. See Vicki Been, Comment on Professor Jerry Frug’s The Geography of Community,  
48 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1996) (describing practice of fiscal zoning and collecting sources).  
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threat, of course, is only rarely credible at the state or national level; it is 
relatively more costly for an individual or firm to move across state lines 
or abroad than to move within their current region, where they have 
established social and economic networks.232 Tiebout competition’s 
greater force at the local level helps explain why a second legislative 
chamber is considered less necessary at the local level than for states and 
the federal government.  
Likewise, state control of local governments theoretically offers 
meaningful protections to worried residents. State governments already 
limit the powers of local government, variously empowering and 
constraining cities, towns and counties in manners that shape what ends 
local governments can pursue.233 In addition to that static structuring of 
local government’s powers, states can intervene in local affairs at will, 
whether in one-off decisions or broader limitations of local power. 
Depending on the form of home rule, state legislatures have the power to 
preempt between some and all of a local government’s actions.234 As a 
practical matter, states can overrule nearly any local decision they find 
troubling.235 And states use this power constantly.236  
Should a local government enact patently unwise legislation, in most 
cases residents could petition the state government to undo it. More 
commonly, when a local government enacts controversial legislation, the 
losing side can also petition the state government, where their allies 
might constitute a majority, to pull rank.237 In either situation, the state 
legislature serves as a counterweight against local power: Rather than a 
second chamber whose concurrent assent is necessary for legislation to 
 
 232. See Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1353 (2014) (“Naturally, the costs 
of, and job barriers to, switching governmental providers are lowered when the relevant government 
is smaller.”); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional 
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 274 (1997) 
(“Competition for residents is more likely among localities within a state, or states within a federation, 
than among nation states.”).  
 233. See generally FRUG & BARRON, supra note 220.  
 234. Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1126–27 (2007) (discussing varieties 
of home rule and noting difficulties of precisely categorizing or quantifying each variety, given state-
by-state distinctions).  
 235. David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 392 (2001) 
(“[H]ardly any impediments to the exercise of state power vis-à-vis local governments exist in state 
constitutional law.”).  
 236. See Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 254 
(2004) (collecting cases “from local tobacco and firearm regulation, to gay and lesbian rights, and 
domestic partnership ordinances, to campaign finance reform measures, and ‘living wage’ laws”). 
 237. Shaila Dewan, States Are Blocking Local Regulations, Often at Industry’s Behest, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/us/govern-yourselves-state-law 
makers-tell-cities-but-not-too-much.html?_r=0 (“[P]re-empting the power of local governments is 
becoming a standard part of the legislative playbook in many states where Republicans who control 
statehouses are looking to block or overturn the actions of . . . municipalities that are often more 
liberal.”). 
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pass, the state legislature retains the option of vetoing (or modifying) the 
local legislation.  
As with interjurisdictional competition, preemption affects local 
governments more than states. First, both states and the federal 
government can preempt local governments, while only one body can 
preempt states.238 Second, home rule provisions, even where they 
provide some protections to local government, rarely have the heft of the 
national constitution’s protections for federalism.239 In the wake of the 
Rehnquist Court’s revival of federalism doctrines,240 there are renewed 
protections for states, ranging from canons of statutory interpretation241 
to sovereign immunity doctrines.242 While home rule has its own 
jurisprudence, its protections are generally considered not nearly as 
strong.243 With local legislation easier to preempt than state legislation, 
bicameralism should be less necessary at the local level.  
But local government’s relative powerlessness is not enough to 
explain local unicameralism. In an absolute sense, local governments 
remain extremely powerful. They routinely take actions that might seem 
to require checking and balancing. The Department of Justice’s 
investigation into police practices in Ferguson, Missouri, for example, 
found that local policies treated residents “less as constituents to be 
protected than as potential offenders and sources of revenue,” and were 
pervaded with “deeply embedded constitutional deficiencies,” including 
systematic harassment, racial discrimination and violence.244 Of course, 
those deficiencies ended in the death of a teenager at the hands of local 
police and a violent confrontation between Ferguson residents and 
Ferguson police.245 The images of tanks, tear gas, and incendiary devices 
 
 238. Diller, supra note 234, at 1114. 
 239. See Barron, supra note 235, at 392 (describing home rule provisions “mini-Tenth 
Amendments” that are supposed to defend against state assertions of preemptive power, but which 
are rarely construed as such by state courts).  
 240. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism 
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 430–33 (2002) (summarizing federalism trends in constitutional 
law and statutory interpretation). 
 241. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991). 
 242. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).  
 243. For example, David Barron observes that there are “state constitutional prohibitions against 
special legislation that may limit a state’s capacity to regulate a particular city, but these often are 
honored in the breach.” Barron, supra note 235, at 392 n.35. See Briffault, supra note 236, at 257 
(“Even within state systems, home rule does not change the fact that local governments are creatures 
of state law.”). Of course, given the wild diversity of forms of home rule, it is dangerous to generalize. 
Barron, supra note 235, at 253 (finding that home rule doctrines “vary[] from state to state, and even 
within a state”).  
 244. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIV. RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
2, 6 (2015).  
 245. See Wesley Lowery, Police Use Tear Gas On Crowd In Ferguson, Mo., Protesting Teen’s 
Death, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/ 
08/12/police-use-tear-gas-on-crowd/?utm_term=.5279a1a70423.  
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being used by police made painfully clear that local governments are not 
entirely impotent. Neither state supervision nor the mobility of black 
residents prevented the Ferguson government from exercising power in 
its rawest form. Local control over police¾sovereignty 
instantiated246¾is enough, on its own, to reject any blanket claims of 
local incapacity.247 
Policing is not the only area in which local governments remain 
powerful. Richard Briffault has noted that local governments have the 
dominant role in setting education and land use policy in this country, 
and that, as a practical matter, the courts have guarded that local role 
even against constitutional claims of equality and individual rights.248 
These policies in turn affect residents’ lifelong economic opportunity, 
social mobility, and physical and mental health in ways that social 
scientists are only just beginning to uncover.249 Exclusionary land use 
policies, set overwhelmingly by local governments, have been estimated 
to cost the U.S. economy $1.95 trillion250 and at the individual level, the 
personal devastation wrought upon the losers in the housing market can 
be incalculable.251  
Moreover, residents are acutely aware of the importance of their 
local governments, participating frequently and deeply in order to assure 
that the right decisions are reached. They do not trust competition or 
their state representatives alone to protect them. Research shows that 
between eleven percent and twenty-five percent of people, depending on 
the size of the jurisdiction, attend community board meetings, and 
between twenty-five percent and forty percent of people contact their 
 
 246. See Noah M. Kazis, Special Districts, Sovereignty, and the Structure of Local Police Services, 
48 URB. LAW. 417 (2016) (describing special connection between local governments, policing and 
sovereignty). 
 247. See Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1409 (2001) (describing importance of local governments in criminal law). 
 248. Briffault, supra note 218, at 112.  
 249. For a summary of the recent “neighborhood effects” literature, see Barbara Sard & Douglas 
Rice, Realizing the Housing Voucher Program’s Potential to Enable Families to Move to Better 
Neighborhoods, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL. PRIORITIES (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.cbpp.org/research/ 
housing/realizing-the-housing-voucher-programs-potential-to-enable-families-to-move-to. 
Particularly important recent studies include PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN 
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013); Raj Chetty et al., The 
Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to 
Opportunity Experiment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 855 (2016); Raj Chetty et al., Where Is the Land of 
Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q. J. OF ECON. 
1553 (2014).  
 250. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Why Do Cities Matter? Local Growth and Aggregate 
Growth, at 3 (Kreisman Working Paper Series in Housing Law and Policy, Paper No. 21154, Apr. 2015), 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/housing_law_and_policy/36/. 
 251. See generally MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 
(2016) (providing quantitative and qualitative sociology of the eviction process in low-income 
communities). 
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local officials.252 Impassioned neighbors pack zoning hearings to register 
their opposition to nearby developments.253 The felt importance of local 
government to its residents is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that 
eighty-nine percent of parents of K-12 students surveyed in 2007 said 
that they had attended a school or PTA meeting since the start of the 
school year, a level of involvement in governance unimaginable in state 
or federal agencies.254 Local government is not simply allowed to be 
unicameral because the stakes are low, either from the perspective of 
policymakers or residents.255 Local governments exercise deadly 
force¾and local legislatures set policies governing the use of that force. 
That alone makes local governments powerful enough that structural 
constraints on local power, like bicameralism, might be deemed 
necessary. Something more is necessary to explain why unicameralism, 
instead, is preferred.256  
B. TIEBOUT SORTING AND SUBURBAN UNICAMERALISM 
Tiebout competition likely plays a second important function in 
explaining local unicameralism: By sorting residents into relatively 
homogeneous communities, it fosters political environments eager for 
majoritarianism. The dominant political blocs in any particular 
jurisdiction¾and in particular, “homevoters” in the suburbs¾can 
 
 252. J. Eric Oliver, City Size and Civic Involvement in Metropolitan America, 94 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 361, 365 (2000); see also Mike Maciag, The Citizens Most Vocal in Local Government, 
GOVERNING (July 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-national-survey-shows-
citizens-most-vocal-active-in-local-government.html (reporting survey data showing that 19 percent 
of Americans recently contacted their local elected officials and twenty-four percent attended a public 
meeting).  
 253. See ADVISORY COMM’N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. 
& URBAN DEV., “NOT IN MY BACKYARD”: REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 1–8 (1991) 
(“NIMBY groups . . . can be very effective at packing hearing rooms and leaving the impression that 
public opinion is strongly against whatever project they oppose.”); Morton Gitelman, The Role of the 
Neighbors in Zoning Cases, 28 ARK. L. REV. 221, 221 (1974) (“[T]he petitions will invariably be 
circulated and the angry neighbors will crowd the room at the hearing glowering at planning 
commissioners or councilmen and muttering curses at the petitioner.”).  
 254. Chuck Dervarics & Eileen O’Brien, Back to School: How Parent Involvement Affects Student 
Achievement, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC. (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.centerforpubliceducation 
.org/Main-Menu/Public-education/Parent-Involvement/Parent-Involvement.html.  
 255. See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: The 
Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 422–23, 432–36 (2007) (rejecting Peterson’s vision of 
powerless and depoliticized local government and describing broad range of ideological issues which 
local government must address).  
 256. Another argument which may tempt, but which does not stand up to scrutiny, is that local 
unicameralism represents a commitment to equal representation at the local level: that bicameralism 
involves a second, more malapportioned chamber (like the U.S. Senate) and that turning to 
unicameralism represents a move toward fairness. But local unicameralism coexisted with gross 
inequalities in representation for a century. Avery v. Midland County, the case which first applied 
one-person one-vote to local government, concerned a five-member, unicameral county commission 
where one district contained 414 residents and another 67,906. 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968). 
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confidently embrace legislative capacity, secure in the knowledge that 
they and their like-minded neighbors will be the ones to benefit. Like 
Progressive Era advocates of state unicameralism, residents of a Tiebout-
sorted town want a legislative structure that can consistently effectuate 
the majority’s demands: they demand the vigor of unicameralism, not the 
constraint of bicameralism.  
In the Tiebout model, mobility has (at least) two separate effects.257 
The first, already discussed, is forward-looking. It stems from the threat 
of future mobility: Local governments must cater to people and 
businesses that can leave if dissatisfied. The second arises from the past 
fact of mobility. Since local governments do offer different bundles of 
taxes and services, residents over time arrange themselves into the 
localities that best satisfy their preferences. Although limits on 
residential mobility limit the amount of sorting that takes place, in the 
aggregate, local governments take on a more homogeneous cast than the 
region or state in which they are situated. 
There is substantial, although not entirely uniform, empirical 
evidence that Tiebout sorting in fact occurs.258 For example, one 
influential study found that Michigan municipalities were more 
homogeneous in areas with more local governments for residents to 
choose between.259 Although much sorting takes place on the basis of 
wealth, not political preferences,260 both shape the composition of local 
jurisdictions. The result is at least some degree of homogeneity among 
local voters: some rough consensus on what aims their local government 
should pursue.  
 
 257. Indeed, this is an oversimplification. This paragraph’s sketch of the Tiebout model draws on 
Wallace Oates’ much more thorough review of this complex literature, which describes the many 
varieties of theoretical and empirical research arising out of the Tiebout framework. Wallace E. Oates, 
The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS 
IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 21 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006). 
 258. David Schleicher, I Would, But I Need the Eggs: Why Neither Exit nor Voice Substantially 
Limits Big City Corruption, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 277, 280 (2011) (“[T]here is substantial evidence that 
sorting does occur.”); Keith Dowding et al., Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical Literature,  
31 URB. STUD. 767, 787 (“[A]n impressive array of evidence suggests that the Tiebout family of models 
holds a number of important truths about urban politics.”). 
 259. Edward M. Gramlich & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Micro Estimates of Public Spending Demand 
Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses, 90 J. POL. ECON. 536 (1982) 
(finding greater homogeneity in metropolitan areas with more local governments and more 
opportunities for sorting). 
 260. Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 638 (2002) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, 
THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL 
FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001)) (“[T]he charming image of Tieboutian foot-shoppers 
choosing from different bundles of goods and services based on their individual preferences begins to 
be supplanted by the somewhat less charming image of community choice based primarily on the 
number of investment dollars that each citizen-consumer holds.”); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 31 (1998) (“People who live in unsafe neighborhoods or send their children to 
inadequate schools don’t do so because they have taste for them. They do so because they feel they 
have no other choice.”). 
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This homogeneity is sharpened by the dominance of a particular 
type of citizen in local politics: the “homevoter.”261 A species first 
identified by William Fischel, the homevoter is motivated to participate 
in local politics by her need to protect the (uninsurable) value of her 
home from disadvantageous land use or taxation decisions, which are 
capitalized into housing prices.262 There is a rough consensus that the 
homevoter controls governance in suburban politics,263 and the 
homevoter has recently been gaining power in large cities as well.264 
Homevoter power stems first and foremost from numerical superiority. 
Homeowners substantially outnumber renters in the suburbs and 
commonly use their power in local politics to exclude new renters.265 
Homevoters also have access to informal sources of power, rooted in 
social ties in a small community and a compelling cost-benefit calculus 
for participation.266 Indeed, homevoters are considered so powerful that 
they can effectively control local governments without even needing to 
vote.267  
The combination of Tiebout sorting and homevoter dominance 
within those already homogenous jurisdictions produces a strong 
foundation for local unicameralism. It is a truism that local politics are 
usually more majoritarian, and less protective of minorities, than larger 
polities.268 But bicameralism, and checks and balances more generally, 
are rooted in a distrust of government action. Bicameralism is meant 
both to slow the pace of lawmaking generally and in particular to slow 
 
 261. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001). 
 262. Id.  
 263. Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth 
Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 227, 229 (2014). Id. at 235 (summarizing empirical research as 
mostly consistent with the homevoter theory). But see Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 1824 (2003) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW 
HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 
(2001)) (contesting homevoter hypothesis).  
 264. Been et al., supra note 264, at 229 (“We find a surprising level of empirical support for the 
homevoter-based theory, even though New York City is probably the last place in the United States 
that one would expect to see zoning policy catering to the interests of homeowners . . . .”). 
 265. Fennell, supra note 261, at 629.  
 266. Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the 
Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1648–50 (2006). 
 267. Id. at 1649 (“There is little need for the majority of homeowners to vote if all of the available 
choices in a local election are likely to serve their fundamental interests.”). 
 268. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 
86 YALE L.J. 385, 405 (1977) (arguing that “[s]mall municipalities combine the majoritarian building 
blocks of single issues and few voters[,]” and tracing idea back to Madison); Serkin, supra note 267, 
at 1645 (“Received wisdom suggests that, unlike the state and federal governments, local governments 
are majoritarian.”); Carol M. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA 
L. REV. 1681, 1686 (2007) (describing conventional wisdom that local governments more likely to 
“gang up” on permanent minorities). But see Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1745, 1748 (2005) (pointing out that national minorities may be local majorities).  
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majoritarian lawmaking. As such, bicameralism offers little to 
homogeneous, homevoter-dominated local governments. Homevoters 
can rest secure, knowing that they control their local governments and 
that, in any case, their neighbors already agree with them about what 
matters. Given that control, homevoters should want a mechanism for 
reliable and uninterrupted translation of their preferences into policy.269 
Unicameralism, not bicameralism, gives homevoters in homogeneous 
communities what they want.  
This explanation for local unicameralism also explains why 
suburban unicameralism is so deeply entrenched. Suburbs are smaller, 
allowing greater differentiation across jurisdictions and therefore 
additional sorting.270 Suburbs, due to their higher homeownership rates, 
are also more dominated by homevoters, assuring a tighter identity of 
interest among members of the majority.271  
Another way of looking at it is that due to homevoter power, local 
governments generally, and suburbs in particular, exemplify the qualities 
that advocates of state unicameralism emphasized in their own 
arguments. While believing that societies have fundamentally shared 
interests may have been a misguided bit of Whig ideology when applied 
to the entire state of Pennsylvania at the Founding,272 that belief might 
well reflect reality along the Main Line. And while popular participation 
might not constitute “bicameralism from below” at the state level,273 the 
omnipresent oversight of the homevoter really does help govern suburbs. 
Finally, suburbanites really do demand active government protection 
from “private aggression,”274 albeit in the form of “out-of-scale” 
development rather than the monopolies feared in the Progressive Era.  
Notably, local powerlessness¾whether from Interlocal competition 
or state control¾does not explain the special affinity of suburbs for 
unicameralism. As Richard Briffault has demonstrated, local autonomy 
is at its peak in the suburbs.275 Legislatures and courts alike have been 
solicitous of suburban power to resist urban demands for integration, 
particularly in the areas of education and land use, and suburbs have 
successfully raised walls around their own resource bases.276 If 
 
 269. In a truly homogeneous polity, the challenges of bicameralism are easily overcome, as the two 
chambers are likely to agree. The costs of bicameralism are therefore diminished in this context, 
arguably making it once again more appealing. But in that case, bicameralism offers nothing but a 
procedural hurdle to clear, if an easy one. Why bother?  
 270. See Gramlich & Rubinfeld, supra note 260. 
 271. See Been et al., supra note 264. 
 272. See Williams, supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.  
 275. See generally Briffault, supra note 219; Briffault, supra note 231.  
 276. Briffault, supra note 231, at 355:  
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bicameralism existed only to serve as a check on empowered legislatures, 
one might expect to see a greater openness to it in suburbia. But the 
opposite is true. This suggests that bicameralism is not driven only by a 
demand for checks and balances.  
Rather, bicameralism’s purpose is to provide checks and balances in 
the specific context of diversity, in order to protect disparate groups 
within a single polity.277 Such diversity is present at the national and state 
levels, and generally in large cities as well, and thus bicameralism is more 
valued in those places. Bicameralism’s specific variety of checks and 
balances is not necessary in the more homogeneous suburbs. Thanks to 
Tiebout sorting, suburban power and suburban unicameralism can 
comfortably coexist. Local autonomy allows suburbs to create 
communities of shared interests and then to assertively protect those 
communities against outside demands. Since this sort of suburban 
power, as identified by Briffault, is employed for the benefit of residents 
against non-residents, voters do not seek to check that power (why would 
they?) but rather to enhance it.278  
Put differently, suburban power has substantial negative 
externalities, but its internalized effects are generally positive.279 The 
potential losers of suburban policymaking do not reside in the relevant 
jurisdictions, and their concerns are muffled or redirected as a result. In 
 
The core of local legal autonomy is defensive and preservative, enabling residents of more 
affluent localities to devote local taxable resources to local ends, exclude unwanted land 
uses and users and protect the autonomous local political structure that allows them to 
pursue local policies . . . . Suburbs benefit from the localist values of courts and legislatures 
that discourage modifications of this highly satisfactory status quo and protect them from 
outside interference. 
 277. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948–51 (1983) (describing one purpose of bicameralism 
as preventing minority factions¾a relevant concern only where minority and majority groups coexist 
in the first place).  
 278. Admittedly, state legislatures, in which all groups are represented, provide the menu of 
legislative structures under general-law incorporation. I assume in this section that suburban interests 
dominate the state legislatures, as is overwhelmingly true in American politics, and that they are able 
to coordinate on this issue. See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, 
and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1538 (2007) (“Legislatures in most states are 
heavily dominated by suburban majorities . . . .”). I describe suburban jurisdictions, rather than the state 
legislature, as selecting unicameralism for simplicity of argument: It might be more precise to say that 
suburban jurisdictions select unicameralism through the state legislatures.  
 279. See Briffault, supra note 231 at 355. There are many examples of these externalities. Suburban 
autonomy over land use policies causes environmentally destructive suburban sprawl, see David J. 
Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2263 (2003) (“[T]he current form of home 
rule directs local power in a way that fuels sprawl.”); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Trouble Preserving 
Paradise, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 161–62 (2001) (cataloguing environmental harms of sprawl); 
economically inefficient regional growth, see John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 91 (2014); and unjust exclusion of disadvantaged social groups from opportunity, see 
e.g. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE 
UNDERCLASS (1993)¾negative effects all felt outside suburban borders. In contrast, suburban autonomy 
over education is used to protect educational outcomes for residents. See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, 
The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043 (2002).  
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contrast, at the state and national level, where bicameralism reigns, most 
legislative decisions are internalized; while there are winners and losers, 
both groups tend to reside within the jurisdictional lines. State legislative 
power appears more fearsome than suburban legislative 
power¾although the latter can be immensely destructive¾because 
suburbanites have already sorted themselves into communities with 
relatively unified interests (or more precisely, in which supermajorities 
share relatively unified interests).280  
Thus, Tiebout provides not one but two explanations for local 
unicameralism. On the one hand, the threat of exit disciplines local 
governments, providing a substitute check to unicameral legislatures. On 
the other, the fact of Tiebout sorting assures residents that the 
unicameral legislature’s power will be used consistently for their own 
benefit. Paradoxically, both local powerlessness and local power drive 
local unicameralism. 
C. CHECKS AND BALANCES IN AN EXECUTIVE-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT 
So far, the explanations for local unicameralism have assumed that 
bicameralism indeed promotes checks and balances¾as is generally 
believed at the federal level. But that isn’t always so. Local government 
is, at its heart, executive. Its programmatic focus on administration and 
implementation means that, counterintuitively, unicameralism often 
promotes a healthier system of checks and balances at the local level. 
Bicameralism constrains government by making legislation more 
difficult. But local governments’ role in our federalist system rests 
primarily in administration and implementation, not legislation.281 Even 
as local unicameralism paves the way for swift and efficient lawmaking, 
it also allows the legislature to more effectively oversee the executive, 
where, at the local level, real power operates.282  
Local governance is lodged primarily in the executive branch: Local 
governments are service providers.283 Public employment data make this 
clear. In 2014, local governments employed over 10.5 million public 
 
 280. See Serkin, supra note 267, at 1628 (describing extent of externalities as “uniquely local”). 
 281. Cf. Lael R. Keiser, Why It Matters Whether State Bureaucrats as Opposed to Federal 
Bureaucrats Administer Federal Programs, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS IN 
THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY 207, 208 (George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2003) 
(“[M]ost public policy is carried out at the state and local levels . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
 282. Notably, the previous sections emphasized zoning¾a quintessentially legislative local 
function¾in showing how local governments seek efficiency in legislative design. Taxation and 
budgeting might be another important example.  
 283. Mayor Fiorella LaGuardia famously announced that “[t]here is no Democratic or Republican 
way to pick up garbage.” See Schleicher, supra note 20, at 421 & n.16. 
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employees,284 while the states employed only 3.75 million people,285 and 
the federal government employed 2.7 million civilian workers.286 While 
no one would claim that local government has a dominant role in the 
American system of policymaking, local government plays an outsize part 
in on-the-ground policy implementation.287 
This service delivery-focused role vests particular power in the 
executive branch. The executive can manage public workers in a way that 
legislatures simply cannot. Many of the most important local functions 
operate at the level of personnel, not policy.288 No ordinance can 
meaningfully delineate every step a teacher must take in responding to a 
classroom disruption or an unexpected question from a student, for 
example. Teachers are “street-level bureaucrats,” whose work is 
necessarily difficult to supervise and dependent on individual 
professional judgment.289 So are police, social workers, and many other 
local employees.290 Broad legislative dictates govern the behavior of 
public employees, of course, but direct management often plays a larger 
role.291 Put differently, the superintendent has considerable advantages 
over the school board. This further strengthens executive dominance as 
a default condition of local government.  
Thus, the distinct substantive tasks assigned to local government 
demand a different conception of checks-and-balances: one far friendlier 
to unicameralism.292 This vision of unicameralism-as-check-and-balance 
is best illustrated by a city manager system. In many towns, cities and 
 
 284. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2014 ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT & PAYROLL, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL DATA: MARCH 2014 (2014). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. This shares themes with those who see local governments are as delegated implementers of 
state policy, akin to state agencies. See, e.g., Aaron Saiger, Local Government as a Choice of Agency 
Form, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 423 (2016).  
 288. Cf. Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 420 (1993) (“[M]ost–local governments in the United States are not  
states-in-miniature, possessing broad decisionmaking authority over an array of public services and 
issues, but are instead highly specialized bodies . . . charged with delivering public services . . . .”).  
 289. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
PUBLIC SERVICES (1980).  
 290. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the 
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 57 (2011) (discussing “the difficulty of controlling the 
inevitable discretion of the ‘street level bureaucrats’¾welfare caseworkers, police officers on the beat, 
classroom teachers¾who make on-the-spot, face-to-face decisions that often determine the life 
chances of citizens”).  
 291. See NORMA M. RICCUCCI, HOW MANAGEMENT MATTERS: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS AND 
WELFARE REFORM (2005).  
 292. Unicameralism is not the only structural feature of local government that emphasizes checks 
between the legislative and executive branches, rather than within the legislative branch. Many local actions, 
such as rezonings, require concurrent action between executive bodies and the legislature, through processes 
more involved and articulated than presentment and the veto power. See supra note 60 and accompanying 
text.  
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counties, a nonpartisan, unelected manager primarily oversees 
government.293 The city manager is given carte blanche to run the daily 
operations of government, subject only to the constraints imposed by the 
elected council.294 Moreover, many of those daily operations come 
preapproved by state legislation and need no local legislative 
authorization.295 Thus, in the absence of legislative action, a manager-
operated locality is not dormant, as the federal government would be 
without Congressional action.296 Rather, the city manager would be 
empowered to keep running the full panoply of local activities on her 
own.  
In a council-manager system, therefore, the additional veto point of 
bicameralism does not prevent government action. Rather, bicameralism 
simply increases the manager’s discretion. The baseline state of affairs is 
continuing executive action, led by the manager. A divided legislature 
might act slowly, or not at all, to respond to the manager’s actions, 
however controversial. In contrast, a unicameral legislature is better able 
to monitor and control the city manager. Bicameralism replaces state 
action by elected legislators with action by a single unelected individual, 
a person still able to control the police, the schools, the city planners, and 
the other instruments of local government. This is not the libertarian 
vision of inaction, or the democratic vision of deliberation, praised by 
advocates of bicameralism.  
Even in a strong mayor system, with an elected executive, the default 
state of local government is action rather than inaction. Teachers will 
keep teaching; police officers will keep responding to crimes. The 
increased friction of bicameralism simply shifts power to the executive 
branch, which will continue operating on its own terms without 
legislative intercession. 
Moreover, bicameralism interferes even with the informal methods 
of governance that local legislatures have developed to manage 
governments full of hard-to-regulate street-level bureaucrats. At the local 
level, a substantial amount of legislative action takes the form of 
intervention, not new policymaking. In part, this is because efforts at 
novel local policymaking often are preempted by state governments or 
 
 293. See Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local 
Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2572 (2006) (describing sign on desk of “weak 
mayor” in a council-manager city: “The buck doesn’t stop here. See the city manager.”).  
 294. NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, MODEL CITY CHARTER § 3.04 (8th ed. 2003) (listing powers of city 
manager, including power to “[d]irect and supervise the administration of all departments, offices and 
agencies of the city,” and noting that “the manager will not only perform managerial duties in the city’s 
operations but will also have a significant role in the development of policy”). 
 295. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40 (2018) (“Powers and Duties of Cities and Towns”).  
 296. Cf. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally 
has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”).  
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held to fall outside a local government’s home rule powers.297 As a result, 
local legislatures govern as much by communication as through 
legislation with the force of law. For example, the New York City Council 
does not enact ordinances to micromanage the lane-by-lane design of the 
more than 6000 miles of streets in the city;298 this would be impractical 
and nearly impossible. But the political buy-in of council members is 
necessary for the Department of Transportation to engage in a project as 
small as changing a single street from two lanes to one over ten blocks.299 
In this context and the many others like it, council members do not 
legislate; they instruct.  
This communication-based role of the legislature would be far less 
effective in a bicameral system, where the legislature could not speak 
with one voice. A hearing in one chamber cannot pass messages to the 
bureaucracy as reliably if the other chamber might disagree; a legislator 
cannot credibly claim to speak for her district if her colleague from the 
other chamber voices a contrary opinion. In the face of legislative 
dissensus, agencies would continue to act, simply without effective 
legislative oversight.  
Of course, members of Congress intercede with administrative 
agencies as well, through formal hearings and informal communications, 
bicameralism notwithstanding.300 But the context is different. At the 
federal level, Congressional intervention most commonly follows the 
“representative-as-ombudsman” model, in which the legislator simply 
connects constituents to agencies and helps them navigate the 
bureaucracy, usually to secure access to public benefits.301 When it comes 
to substantive interventions in the discretionary decisions of an agency, 
courts look askance at legislative meddling and protect agencies from 
Congressional intrusions.302 Federal agencies are also more constrained 
by laws and procedures: they are generally  
 
 297. See generally Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113 (2007) (describing 
state preemption of local legislation).  
 298. Strategic Plan 2016: 1. Introduction, NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF TRANSP. (2016), 
http://www.nycdotplan.nyc/introduction (2016).  
 299. See Brad Aaron & Stephen Miller, Tonight: Tell Manhattan CBs That Harlem Needs a Safer 
Morningside Avenue, STREETSBLOG NYC (Oct. 23, 2013), http://nyc.streetsblog.org/2013/10/23/ 
tonight-tell-manhattan-cbs-that-harlem-needs-a-safer-morningside-avenue/.  
 300. See Edward J. Markey, Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer, and 
Partner, 1990 DUKE L.J. 967, 971 (1990).  
 301. See Joshua Bone, Stop Ignoring Pork and Potholes: Election Law and Constituent Service, 
123 YALE L.J. 1406, 1412–14 (2014); see also Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 1099, 1135–36 (2005) (observing that constituent services play a particularly important role 
in local government, compared to Congress).  
 302. Jamelle C. Sharpe, Judging Congressional Oversight, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 183, 185, 197–202 
(2013) (“[C]ourts have decided that federal legislators cannot control or heavily influence how agency 
officials exercise the powers delegated to them.”); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2255–60 (2001) (describing relationship between Congress and agencies).  
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rulemakers and adjudicators, not street-level implementers.303 Local 
government both allows for, and requires, more direct dialogue between 
the legislature and the bureaucracy; unicameralism allows that dialogue 
to be clear and direct.  
It is not just theoretical that local unicameralism is meant to elevate 
the legislature in order to check the executive. The framers of the 1989 
New York City Charter, which finally planted unicameralism firmly into 
the city’s structure, explicitly understood unicameralism to promote 
checks and balances at the local level. They described their restructuring 
of the legislative branch to consist of a single chamber as a decision “to 
empower . . . the Council . . . .”304 Their stated purpose was for the 
“legislature to balance and check the executive branch.”305 Moreover, 
they even connected the value of unicameralism to the executive-focused 
nature of local government.306 Bronx Borough President Fernando 
Ferrer, for example, sharply distinguished between bicameral states and 
the unicameral structure he favored for the city, arguing that cities “fill 
potholes” and provide direct service delivery.307 In New York City, 
unicameralism was an attempt to elevate the status of the legislature 
against the already-empowered executive.  
Indeed, this motivation for unicameralism can even be seen in that 
bastion of bicameralism: the United States Congress. Where the federal 
government most resembles local government’s executive-focused, 
highly discretionary structure¾in foreign affairs¾Congress has 
attempted to make itself more unicameral, to better check the executive. 
For example, the President has broad control over the military and, given 
the exigencies of military action, Congress cannot usually manage 
military operations through its normal lawmaking process.308 Thus, 
when Congress perceived that the President had abused that control, it 
passed the War Powers Resolution, which, among other things, requires 
the President to remove American troops from hostilities unless 
Congress specifically authorizes an operation within sixty days.309 
Effectively, this creates a one-house veto, as either chamber can, on its 
 
 303. Cf. Davidson, supra note 14, at 591–92 (“As increasingly significant as local regulation may 
be, the provision of public services has historically been central to local-government identity, more so 
than at other levels of government.”).  
 304. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 776.  
 305. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 777. 
 306. Schwarz, Jr. & Lane, supra note 141, at 777 (“Much of the focus of a city government is on the 
delivery of services . . . .”).  
 307. Purdum, supra note 150.  
 308. Cf. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb¾Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 691, 751 
(2008) (debating whether Congress may Constitutionally intervene in tactical and operational 
discussions and describing and acknowledging that many such Congressional interventions would be 
“absurd”).  
 309. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2011).  
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own, force an end to the conflict.310 Congress knew that retaining the 
fullest protections of bicameralism would simply empower the executive 
to proceed as it wishes¾just as police forces and school principals would 
be able to do if local governments were bicameral. A move toward 
unicameralism promoted checks-and-balances. Likewise, in the 
intelligence arena, Congress created a special bipartisan, bicameral body, 
nicknamed the “Gang of Eight,” which the executive must inform of all 
covert actions.311 In other words, it created a  
quasi-unicameral entity. When the legislature is placed in an essentially 
reactive position, it must act with unity to check the executive.  
Institutional design in federal foreign policy evidences the same 
principle as in local government design: where the executive is always 
and necessarily active, the legislature is best structured in a streamlined 
manner. In local government, the executive branch is dominant and the 
default condition is executive action. Roadblocks to legislative action, 
such as bicameralism, only strengthen the executive’s hand further. 
Unicameralism empowers the legislature to act efficiently, but in a way 
that often promotes checks and balances. 
D. LACK OF SENTIMENT IN LOCAL LEGISLATURES 
The executive nature of local government provides another 
explanation for local unicameralism as well. Local legislatures¾if not 
local governments¾may be sites for sentiment and cultural meaning to 
a lesser degree than state and federal governments. The arguments for 
unicameralism are fundamentally instrumental, whereas important 
arguments for bicameralism are symbolic. Symbolism, it turns out, plays 
a small role in how local legislatures are constituted. 
The debates over unicameralism at the state and local levels, as 
already noted, involved largely the same arguments on each side. 
However, those arguments had different force in each setting. 
Unicameralism’s supporters emphasized efficiency, seeing bicameralism 
as a source of gridlock due to the effective supermajority requirement it 
imposes.312 They even pointed to the truly mundane issue of direct cost 
savings: One set of legislators requires fewer salaries and health 
insurance plans than two.313 The defenders of bicameralism, in contrast, 
did not only discuss the procedural consequences of a second chamber. 
 
 310. Whether this survives I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) is to some extent an open 
question, Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Clinton Administration and War Powers, 63 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 125, 129 n.25 (2000), but not one relevant here. As a matter of institutional design,  
single-chamber action was deemed necessary to constrain executive power in this area.  
 311. See Kathleen Clark, “A New Era of Openness?”: Disclosing Intelligence to Congress Under 
Obama, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 313, 318 (2010).  
 312. See supra Part I.A. 
 313. See, e.g., supra notes 92, 117.  
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They described bicameralism as rooted in tradition and elevated by the 
blessing of the Framers of the national Constitution.314 
Cultural, symbolic arguments for bicameralism were available for 
local government. Most large cities began as bicameral, as Part I.A shows. 
Cities could have sought to maintain a connection to that past by 
maintaining their upper legislative chambers, but did not do so.315 They 
could have continued to cultivate comparisons to the federal 
government, as Baltimore tried to do in its early experiment with a local 
electoral college.316 Indeed, local governments have roughly as strong a 
historical claim to an early bicameral tradition as do the states: After all, 
three states adopted unicameral legislatures during the Revolutionary 
and Founding eras.317 
Moreover, these traditionalist arguments were made in the debates 
over local unicameralism; they simply did not take. In Arizona and 
Alaska, the historical record shows appeals to the traditional  
two-chambered legislative structure and comparisons to Congress to 
have been effective, even determinative, arguments.318 For states, it was 
demeaning or unserious to adopt unicameralism. In Atlanta, though, 
when the same appeals were marshaled, they did not define the public 
discourse. A rhetoric of modernization dominated in Atlanta (and 
Philadelphia, and in the newspaper coverage of unicameralism debates 
across the country), not a rhetoric of traditionalism. Local legislatures 
were meant to get things done, not serve as repositories for public 
meaning.319 
In some sense, Everett¾that singular holdout for so long¾is the 
exception that proves the rule. Bicameralism lasted so long in Everett 
because bicameralism took on special cultural significance as a local 
tradition, a “badge of pride.”320 Indeed, for many years, Everett held 
summertime picnics and softball games with Waterville, Maine, the 
 
 314. See supra Part I.A. 
 315. This could be done even with a vestigial upper chamber, akin to the contemporary House of 
Lords. See Stephen Gardbaum, Separation of Powers and the Growth of Judicial Review in 
Established Democracies (or Why Has the Model of Legislative Supremacy Mostly Been Withdrawn 
from Sale?), 62 AM. J. COMPARATIVE L. 613, 636 (2014) (describing vestigial upper chambers in the 
United Kingdom, Belgium and Canada).  
 316. Supra notes 67-70.  
 317. Supra notes 170-72.  
 318. Supra notes 188–92, 200–02 and accompanying text.  
 319. Perhaps nothing illustrates the contrast with state legislatures better¾or at least more 
colorfully¾than Massachusetts’ Sacred Cod. A symbol of the state legislature since the 18th century, 
this carved wooden fish is treated with such veneration that when the legislature moved to a new State 
House, representatives carried it wrapped in an American flag. When it was briefly “codnapped,” the 
loss was deemed important enough to dredge the Charles River. Maria Abate, History of the Sacred 
Cod, EEEF2008: ECOLOGICAL AND EVOLUTIONARY ETHOLOGY OF FISHES, BOSTON U. (2008), 
https://www.bu.edu/eeef/sacredcodhistory.html. This sort of ritualism is generally absent at the local 
level.  
 320. Rosenberg, supra note 7.  
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second-to-last city to abandon bicameralism.321 Everett was not more or 
less powerful than any other Massachusetts municipality, subject to 
different pulls from interlocal competition or state control, or uniquely 
heterogeneous. But its bicameral legislature had a unique significance for 
the town, just as bicameralism has a singular place in the popular 
understanding of the federal constitution. In the rare case where a local 
legislature became a site for tradition and civic self-understanding, 
bicameralism showed much more staying power.  
The emptiness of local legislature as cultural objects mirrors the 
formal constitutional status of local governments. Doctrinally, local 
governments are mere administrative appendages of the state, 
constitutionally no different than administrative agencies.322 From this 
perspective, local governments are merely a helpful mechanism for 
states, the true holders of sovereignty, to achieve their ends, and they can 
be created, destroyed, or reorganized as needed by state governments.323 
If the very identity or existence of a local government has no permanence, 
why should the structure of its legislature? Rather, the design of local 
governments is like the design of agencies: functionalist. Agencies are 
structured by Congressional drafters who seek to advance particular 
bureaucratic goals through institutional design.324 The internal 
organization of an agency, however, is of essentially no symbolic salience 
to the general public.325 Likewise, the choice of local legislative structure 
has historically turned on instrumental rather than cultural calculations. 
States, which jealously guard their status as “dual sovereigns” from 
encroachment,326 mirror federal institutions to visibly and symbolically 
demonstrate their equality with the national government. Local 
governments, which lack that formal sovereignty, need not strive for that 
stature.  
 
 321. Rosenberg, supra note 7. 
 322. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).  
 323. Id. But see Briffault, supra note 218 (discussing implicit constitutional protections for local 
government); Kazis, supra note 246 (arguing that local governments retain the fundamental quality 
of sovereignty: a monopoly on the legitimate use of force).  
 324. See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and 
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013) (analyzing structural features of federal 
administrative agencies).  
 325. For example, one think tank article on how to effectively reorganize the executive branch 
details the potential opposition to reorganization from within the bureaucracy and on Capitol Hill from 
those guarding their turf and discusses how to manage interest groups and stakeholders. It does not 
identify public opinion or messaging as relevant to the reorganization process. Harrison Wellford et 
al., Executive Reorganization: Six Lessons from the 1970s, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (June 9, 2011), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/general/report/2011/06/09/9732/executive-reorg 
anization/.  
 326. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). 
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Although local legislatures are designed instrumentally, one should 
not overstate the instrumentalism of local government writ large.327 
People identify with their cities and towns. Moreover, they identify with 
the governmental institutions of their cities and towns, not only the 
geographic communities those governments happen to cover. Mayors 
can “generate collective feelings of ownership and belonging and can 
articulate a city’s civic identity,” as Richard Schragger has argued.328 
Even certain local bureaucracies are sites of public sentiment. Cities 
rename street corners for slain police officers,329 and professional sports 
teams hold moments of silence for firefighters killed in the line of duty.330 
Like soldiers for the nation, public safety workers stand in for the local 
body politic. But local legislatures are not the sites for this sort of civic 
religion: for the reasons identified in the previous section, the executive 
is. Consequently, neither tradition nor the federal analogy pushes local 
governments toward bicameralism with much force.  
Local unicameralism does not reflect only the dynamics of cost and 
benefit. It is the product of more than a weighing of the risks and rewards 
of majoritarianism in a particular context of local power and 
powerlessness. As the city of Everett¾or the state of 
Alaska¾demonstrates, cultural forces can overwhelm cool-eyed 
calculations of institutional design. But at the local level, there is little 
cultural pressure to retain the federally inspired seemliness of 
bicameralism or even simply to keep traditional institutions in place. 
Befitting their constitutional status as mere instrumentalities of the state, 
local legislatures can be designed and redesigned for instrumental ends. 
E. CONVERGENCE IN THE FACE OF LOCAL DIFFERENCE 
This Part has offered four explanations for why local governments, 
but not states, have embraced the efficiency and majoritarianism of 
unicameralism. All apply to “local governments” in the abstract, but local 
 
 327. Aaron Saiger’s provocative and illuminating comparison of local governments and state 
administrative agencies falls into this trap, underestimating how much citizens understand their local 
governments to be meaningfully independent, and not actually administrative agencies. Saiger, supra 
note 287. His proposal for importing notice-and-comment procedures, including additional voice for 
those outside jurisdictional boundaries, into local lawmaking would, I think, meet widespread 
resistance from residents who see themselves as citizens, not stakeholders. Saiger, supra note 287, at 
448–49. As one example, participants in local administrative procedures routinely emphasize not only 
that they are local residents but also how long they have lived there¾citizenship is highly valued in 
this setting. 
 328. Schragger, supra note 17, at 2573. 
 329. See, e.g., Graham Rayman & Nathan Place, South Bronx Street Renamed After Kevin Gillespie, 
NYPD Officer Killed in 1996 Carjacking, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
new-york/south-bronx-street-renamed-killed-carjacking-article-1.2561733.  
 330. See, e.g., Tod Palmer, Royals, KCFD Hold Moment of Silence Before ALDS Game 5, KANSAS 
CITY STAR (Oct. 14, 2015, 2:12 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/sports/spt-columns-blogs/k-zone/ 
article39156336.html.  
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governments are not abstract. They are diverse in size, shape, and 
function and usually have the institutional differences to match. Why, 
then, have they all adopted unicameralism in lockstep?  
Given the vast differences between individual cities, towns, counties 
and special districts, the weight of each of these four explanations for 
local unicameralism will vary across jurisdictions and across decades. 
Tiebout competition acts more forcefully on some places and during 
some eras, depending on the costs of moving.331 Some cities are diverse 
metropoles, not small homogenous communities.332 A “contract city” 
that outsources all its services, keeping in-house only taxation and land-
use decisions, will be less executive-dominated than one that provides for 
itself.333 Each government has its own path to unicameralism. 
Even so, while the relative force of each explanation advanced here 
varies jurisdiction by jurisdiction, the direction in which each points does 
not. Each consistently distinguishes local government from the states: It 
is near-definitional that a city or town will be more constrained than the 
state it is a part of, for example, or that the policy preferences of its 
residents will vary less. Thus, some combination of these features of local 
government always presses down on one side of the scales between 
efficiency and checks and balances, or between modernization and 
tradition. In Atlanta, bicameralism might suddenly appear clunky 
because the city needs to forcefully respond to competition from new 
suburbs; but in those same suburbs, it might be residents’ unity of 
interests that most shapes perception of legislative design. In New York 
City, it might be the enormous power wielded by the mayor and the 
executive branch, given the scope of services the city provides. Local 
governments differ from each other, but their shared features, taken 
together in varying blends, always push toward unicameralism. 
Given the more than 90,000 local governments, though, it still 
remains remarkable that not one retains a bicameral structure.334 
Somehow, all heterogeneity was excised. Most likely, two other features 
of local government explain the final mopping up of any difference. First, 
as Susan Rose-Ackerman famously observed, local government leaders 
 
 331. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 228, at 1535 (“[A]gglomeration is interfering with Tiebout 
sorting; the existence of agglomeration gains reduces the degree to which people sort between local 
governments on the basis of their policy preferences.”); Jan K. Brueckner & David Neumark, Beaches, 
Sunshine, and Public Sector Pay: Theory and Evidence on Amenities and Rent Extraction by 
Government Workers, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 198, 227 (2014).  
 332. It is likely no coincidence that New York City¾which is diverse, has the economic strength to 
resist some interlocal competition and the political strength to resist some state incursions on its 
power¾retained its variant on bicameralism until the end of the 20th century. 
 333. See GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION (1981).  
 334. Of course, this is in some ways an accident of timing. Had this Article been published a few 
years earlier, there would have been one: Everett. In analyzing the uniformity of local legislative 
design, there is little meaningful difference between zero and a handful of outliers: Until it joined the 
pack, Everett was merely the exception that proved the rule.  
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have strong incentives to avoid risky innovation.335 Moreover, for this 
kind of structural innovation, the countervailing forces supporting local 
policy innovation¾such as ideology, political parties and interest 
groups¾do not exist in today’s political culture.336 Put simply, by the end 
of the 20th century, the founders of a new municipality or special service 
district incorporating on the edge of a fast-growing city would have every 
incentive to follow their neighbors and stick to unicameralism, without 
investing their efforts and political capital in the (local) oddity of 
bicameralism.  
Second, local government budgets are small and tight: the minor 
direct fiscal savings of unicameralism are enough to matter and enough 
to tilt the balance for a wavering government.337 A local budget can 
always be measured in salaries, and a legislator’s pay can be directly 
weighed against another teacher in the classrooms. For a city still flirting 
with bicameralism, “everyone else is doing it” and “we could hire a few 
more cops” could be determinative arguments: not enough to explain the 
overwhelming push towards unicameralism in the first place, but 
sufficient to herd in any outliers. Copycat behavior and the ever-present 
need to trim the budget consolidated the convergence of local 
governments on a single legislative design. They brought us to the 
constitutional condition of today, where unicameralism has swept the 
field.  
III.  THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN A UNICAMERAL WORLD 
So far, this Article has attempted to explain why local government 
has become uniformly unicameral. It offered both a historical account of 
the path taken to unicameralism and a more theoretical exploration of 
why local government might be better suited to unicameralism. But at 
this point, local unicameralism is a fact about American government, and 
a settled one at that. Looking forward, local unicameralism can be taken 
as a given¾although existing scholarship has not done so. In this Part, I 
show how acknowledging local unicameralism has important 
implications for three long-running scholarly debates. Within local 
 
 335. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk-Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 
9 J. LEG. STUD. 593, 594 (1980).  
 336. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in 
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1379–97 (2009) (summarizing literature 
responding to Rose-Ackerman thesis on local risk aversion). Notably, this is not always true: In the 
Progressive Era, local institutional design had powerful ideological and institutional backers and could 
provide local innovators with substantial reputational benefits.  
 337. In Everett, for example, the now-unicameral city council’s personnel costs total $342,538 in 
the most recent budget, out of $56.5 million in total city department spending, excluding schools. CITY 
OF EVERETT, FY 18 ANNUAL BUDGET (2017), http://cityofeverett.com/DocumentCenter/ 
View/2608. At more than half a percent, legislative personnel makes up a meaningful line item in tight 
times, even if not the driver of the city budget.  
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government law, the fact of local unicameralism helps recast the conflict 
between localists and regionalists, and in particular arguments over the 
importance of political participation in local government. It suggests that 
local government is structured to promote participation in 
administrative, not legislative, processes, and that participationist 
defenses of localism must adjust accordingly.  
But the divide between local and state or federal legislative design 
has implications far outside local government law as well. Statutory 
interpretation methodologies and theories of judicial review, too, must 
make room for local difference. This Article only scratches the surface. 
Its goal is to carve out space for a specifically local jurisprudence, distinct 
from the doctrines developed for the federal government. But to begin 
that effort, it shows how courts should be more willing to use legislative 
history when interpreting local ordinances and argues that the hyper-
majoritarianism of local governments requires a recalibration of judicial 
review to be more supportive of policy experimentation but also more 
vigilant against failures of the democratic process. 
A. LOCALISM, PARTICIPATION, AND UNICAMERALISM 
Among scholars of local government law, perhaps no debate is more 
fundamental than that between localists and regionalists.338 Generally 
speaking, the localists seek to devolve power downwards¾even to the 
neighborhood level¾while regionalists would push governance upward 
and away from municipalities.339 These camps have additional internal 
taxonomies. One set of localists sees towns, cities, and even 
neighborhoods as sites for communitarian values: civic engagement and 
active democratic participation.340 The regionalists, instead, see 
smallness as fostering parochialism and exclusion, not positive 
 
 338. See Briffault, supra note 230, at 392–93 (describing and challenging dominance among 
scholars of “general proposition that local autonomy should be protected and enhanced”); David 
Schleicher, Local Government Law’s “Law and ___” Problem, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1951, 1963 
(2013) (expressing disappointment in local government literature for failure to move past 
localism/regionalism debate).  
 339. See Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2000) (describing 
localism, regionalism, and their relationship). 
 340. See discussion infra notes 345-353. Other localists, focused on Tiebout competition and 
citizen oversight, see smaller levels of government as fostering competition and thereby efficiency. See, 
e.g., Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency 
Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988) (describing perspective that “views 
interjurisdictional competition as a beneficent force that, similar to its role in the private sector, 
compels public agents to make efficient decisions”); Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and 
Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190, 200 (2001) (noting that “competition among 
localities . . . is credited with controlling bureaucratic budgets and facilitating monitoring of local 
officials[,]” and collecting sources); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of 
Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 73, 85 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) 
(“[T]he current empirical evidence suggests competitive local governments can provide an efficient 
level of congestible (local) public goods.”). 
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democratic values, or at least perceive participation not to be worth the 
high costs of balkanization and inefficient administration.341 The fact of 
local unicameralism¾and more importantly, its history¾sheds new 
light on this aspect of the localism debate.  
By selecting unicameralism, local governments have already opted 
against maximum participation in structuring the legislative process. At 
least within the legislative branch, local government embodies the virtues 
of efficiency and rough majoritarianism, not participation and 
consensus. Grappling with local unicameralism reveals the participatory 
localists to be, as Rick Hills has argued, romantics.342 Deliberative 
democracy may be a noble vision for local government, but it is not 
always the choice of local governments themselves. If participatory 
democracy is to be the basis for a new localist devolution of power, its 
supporters must understand where that participation occurs in local 
government¾and where it does not.343 
A robust literature exists defending local governments as sites for 
fostering participation and forming community.344 This tradition traces 
itself back to Thomas Jefferson’s embrace of the New England town 
meeting as “little republics,”345 Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill’s 
perception that local government teaches the skills of citizenship,346 and 
to Hannah Arendt’s promotion of “public freedom” through civic 
participation.347 More recently, Jerry Frug, for example, has written 
extensively about the “values of decentralization¾the freedom gained 
from the ability to participate in the basic societal decisions that affect 
 
 341. See, e.g., DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (2d ed. 1993); MYRON ORFIELD, 
METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY (1997); Briffault, supra note 339, 
at 7–14; Cashin, infra note 344, at 1990.  
 342. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a Democratic Defense of 
City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009 (2000) (reviewing GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING 
COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999)). 
 343. This is a practical argument. I take no stand on the appropriate role for participation in local 
government; the historical choice to minimize participatory values in designing local legislatures does 
not justify that outcome. Nor do I suggest that participatory localists must make their peace with the 
form of local legislatures that do not embody their values. But if those localists hope to actually 
increase participation in local government, they must respond to the structural forces arrayed against 
them in the legislative sphere. 
 344. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: 
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1998 (2000) (“The sine qua non of 
localism is the idea that small government best facilitates political participation and civic engagement 
by the public.”); cf. Joseph P. Viteritti & Gerald J. Russello, Community and American Federalism: 
Images Romantic and Real, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 683 (1997) (describing history of “romantic image” 
of local community in American politics).  
 345. See Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1382 (2014) (quoting Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to Governor John Tyler (May 26, 1810), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
391, 393–94 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907)).  
 346. Cf. Hills, supra note 342, at 2028. 
 347. Shoked, supra note 345, at 1382 (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 114–15, 119–20 
(1963)).  
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one’s life, the creativity generated by the capacity to experiment in 
solving public problems and to tailor possible solutions to local needs, 
and the energy derived from democratic forms of organization.”348 While 
cognizant of the ways that current local government law supports 
inequality, Frug dismisses larger governments as unable to “engender the 
kind of democratic participation in public affairs that is possible on a 
local basis.”349  
In a similar vein, Georgette Poindexter has celebrated smaller 
governments as allowing a citizen to “have a meaningful voice in 
participatory democracy” and thereby to “count herself as a consensual 
member of the community.”350 She has described the neighborhood as 
the “optimal level for city government” because it best “fosters 
community at the local level by increasing participation in 
democracy . . . .”351 For Frug, Poindexter, and others in this civic 
republican tradition,352 hands-on participation and face-to-face 
deliberation, possible only at a small scale, promote true democracy.353 
Their support for localism rests, in part, on their belief that local 
government in fact embodies participatory and consensual norms.  
Local government truly is, in certain ways, more participatory and 
communitarian than state and federal government. Empirical evidence 
suggests that in smaller jurisdictions, citizens are more likely to contact 
their elected officials or attend public meetings (although voting rates are 
lower).354 Additionally, the sheer number of local government 
officials¾around three percent of adult Americans have served in local 
government in some capacity¾makes local government much more 
accessible.355 But of all the reasons that local government are 
participatory, local legislatures are not one of them.  
By choosing unicameralism, local governments have opted against 
deliberation, participation, and consensus in the legislative process. Most 
obviously, bicameralism doubles a citizen’s opportunities for direct 
 
 348. Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 257 (1993).  
 349. Id. at 271.  
 350. Georgette C. Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City,  
145 U. PA. L. REV. 607, 616 (1997).  
 351. Id. at 649.  
 352. See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal 
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1908 (1994) (“Participatory politics cannot thrive in a mass 
democracy. If anything, local units need to become smaller to make meaningful political participation 
feasible.”); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389–94 (1997); see also Carol 
M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on 
“Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 74, 96–97 (1989) (providing a more eclectic 
vision of local government informed by participatory and republican values).  
 353. Cashin, supra note 344, at 2001–02.  
 354. See, e.g., J. ERIC OLIVER, DEMOCRACY IN SUBURBIA 42–52 (2001).  
 355. Hills, supra note 342, at 2027 (citing SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E. 
BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 51 (1995)).  
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engagement with their representatives. Instead of one city councilman, 
she might have a councilman and an alderman. Bicameralism also offers 
double the hearings, for those who prioritize more public and structured 
forms of participation. It offers two leadership structures, doubling the 
chances for ordinary citizens to test the waters of local politics and then 
rise to positions of power.356 As the president of Everett’s Board of 
Aldermen argued in opposing his city’s turn to unicameralism, a second 
chamber is “an inexpensive way for people to have access to government 
officials.”357 What’s more, switches from bicameralism to unicameralism 
were frequently paired with reductions in the overall size of the local 
legislature.358 Unicameralism was meant to streamline local legislatures, 
even at the expense of access.359 
Unicameralism makes legislatures less republican in other, subtler 
ways as well. Bicameralism, famously, functions as a supermajority 
requirement.360 This prioritizes consensus building, since  
near-consensus can be required to secure the approval of both houses 
simultaneously.361 Bicameralism also encourages deliberation: Not only 
must two chambers simultaneously agree on a policy, they must then 
compromise between themselves as to each detail in another round of 
negotiation.362 The Framers understood bicameralism to promote 
deliberation and consensus.363 In choosing unicameralism, the framers 
of local government law instead opted for the power of a simple majority 
to act expeditiously. 
And unlike even a supermajoritarian unicameral legislature, 
bicameral legislatures can be split along partisan lines. Parties are 
essential mediating entities for political participation, so partisan control 
 
 356. Cf. Independent Staff, supra note 124 (quoting critic of unicameralism in Everett as arguing 
that “it’s going to eliminate a lot of people that are trying to get into the process. Most of our mayors 
at some point had come from the city council or started out on a board and worked their way up.”).  
 357. Rosenberg, supra note 7.  
 358. See, e.g., Contosta, supra note 82 and accompanying text.  
 359. Arguably, unicameralism improves access. If your legislator listens to you, he can more easily 
translate your input into policy and if he does not, you can more easily hold him accountable. But this 
is still less access, and a shift from a more republican to a more liberal model of representation.  
 360. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 242 (1962).  
 361. See John F. Manning, The Role of the Philadelphia Convention in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1753, 1781–82 (2012) (noting that bicameralism requires 
“unusual consensus” and “compromise”).  
 362. Cf. Rogers, supra note 187, at 108–09 (describing relationship of conference committees and 
unicameralism).  
 363. Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1562; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 443 (Alexander 
Hamilton): 
The oftener the measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the 
situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which 
flow from want of due deliberation or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion 
of some common passion or interest.  
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of a branch of government critically enhances opportunities for effective 
civic engagement.364 In a divided legislature, there is no minority party 
shut out of governance;365 all citizens and all interest groups have a 
chance to make their voices heard. Unicameral local governments cannot 
offer that protection to their political minorities. Its proponents saw 
divided government as gridlock to be avoided. 
As might be expected, given their majoritarian unicameralist design, 
local legislatures are not generally heralded as sites of democratic values 
or popular participation. City councils in municipalities large and small 
are routinely described as operating behind closed doors or in smoke-
filled rooms.366 Often, leadership is top-down with presidents and 
speakers exercising total control over the legislative agenda.367 This can 
be characterized positively or negatively, but it cannot be described as 
deliberative, participatory democracy.  
Rather, participation in local government is concentrated in the 
administrative process. Neighbors pack zoning hearings, anxiously 
concerned about changes to their block (and perhaps their property 
values).368 Parents attend parent-teacher conferences multiple times per 
year and organize parent-teacher associations to participate further in 
school governance.369 Under Chicago’s community policing model, each 
of the city’s 279 police beats holds a monthly meeting for residents to 
 
 364. See Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over: McCutcheon, Shadow Parties, 
and the Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 206–07 (2014) (describing “competition 
and cajoling, the disagreeing and the deliberating, the buttonholing and bickering that takes 
place¾and should continue to take place¾within the party itself”). 
 365. See Schleicher, supra note 19.  
 366. See, e.g., McCrea v. Flaherty, 885 N.E.2d 836, 838 (Mass. Ct. App. 2008) (“The city council 
of Boston . . . finds itself, not for the first time, on the losing end of a determination that it has 
improperly excluded the public from its deliberations.”); Jeff McMenemy, Splaine Ready to Go to 
Court over City Council’s “Non-Meetings,” PORTSMOUTH HERALD (Nov. 25, 2016, 2:27 PM), 
http://www.seacoastonline.com/news/20161125/splaine-ready-to-go-to-court-over-city-councils-
non-meetings (describing legal battles between Portsmouth, New Hampshire city council and 
assistant mayor over closed sessions); Scott Franz, Steamboat Springs City Council Doing More 
Business Behind Closed Doors, STEAMBOAT TODAY (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.steamboattoday 
.com/news/steamboat-springs-city-council-doing-more-business-behind-closed-doors (City Council 
of Steamboat Springs, Colorado met in closed sessions forty-two percent of time, after members 
campaigned on pro-transparency platform).  
 367. See, e.g., Harold Jackson, Opinion, Clarke the Most Powerful Person in City Hall, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Oct. 29, 2014, 10:35 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/under-the-sun/ 
Clarke-the-most-powerful-person-in-City-Hall.html (“Rarely does any other Council member utter a 
peep in opposition to their president’s desires.”).  
 368. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45, 83–85 
(1994) (describing “Zoning as A Participatory Democracy”); WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER 
HYPOTHESIS 9 (2009) (describing otherwise-sane neighbors suddenly behaving as “crazy” NIMBYs at 
zoning board hearing).  
 369. CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN SCHOOLS 3 (2013), http://www.child 
trends.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/39_Parent_Involvement_In_Schools.pdf (collecting data 
showing that seventy-six percent of students’ parents attended a meeting with teachers and forty-two 
percent volunteered with the school).  
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work with officers; an average of twenty-six residents attend each 
meeting.370 These executive branch encounters¾which needless to say, 
look very different than a HUD or Education Department rulemaking at 
the federal level¾are where local government gains its participatory 
edge.  
Noticing local unicameralism helps clarify where in local 
government participation occurs. In turn, that can help shape proposals 
for reform. For example, Gerald Frug has famously and repeatedly called 
for the creation of new “regional legislature[s].”371 These legislatures 
would lack an attached regional government; administration would still 
occur through existing municipalities.372 Importantly, Frug’s goal is 
dialogic, he intends the regional legislature not simply to preempt local 
powers by a more regionally minded entity¾state governments can 
already do that,373 and in any case Frug is no regionalist¾but to serve as 
a “forum for inter-local negotiations about how to decentralize power.”374 
Frug hopes to “transform[] the subjectivity of the region’s localities” and 
help them “reach[] for the perspectives of other and different persons.”375  
But an examination of local unicameralism reveals that Frug looks 
in exactly the wrong place for his goal.376 At the local level, legislatures 
are not sites for dialogue, negotiation, consensus-building, or identity 
formation. They are designed to enact policy preferences with a 
minimum of fuss. Nor is there even a glimmer of popular desire to return 
local legislatures to a bicameral design. Thus, Frug attempts to increase 
local participation in precisely the manner that faces the fiercest 
headwinds: he seeks dialogue in the branch where historical and 
structural features of local government have relentlessly stripped out 
dialogue and replaced it with arch majoritarianism and flat 
instrumentalism. To achieve Frug’s goal of restructuring local 
government law to “build unity out of differences,”377 it might be better 
to look to the real sites of democratic action at the local level: the 
executive branch. For example, consolidated school districts, magnet 
 
 370. WESLEY G. SKOGAN, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT: 
COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO 3 (2000), http://www.skogan.org/files/Public 
_Involvement-Community_Policing_in_Chicago.NIJ_Summary.pdf.  
 371. Frug, supra note 348, at 294–300; see also Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002) (one of many elaborations of the idea).  
 372. Frug, supra note 349, at 294–97.  
 373. See, e.g., Jason Moreira, Regionalism, Federalism, and the Paradox of Local Democracy: 
Reclaiming State Power in Pursuit of Regional Equity, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 501, 536–42 (2015). 
 374. Frug, supra note 349, at 297.  
 375. Frug, supra note 349, at 295, 299 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 
1493, 1528 (1988). 
 376. Frug’s proposal is subject to a great many other persuasive criticisms. See, e.g., Hills, supra 
note 343; Been, supra note 231, at 1112–14. 
 377. Frug, supra note 349, at 300.  
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schools, or interdistrict busing schemes might all be better placed to 
promote this pluralistic vision that a regional legislature would be.378 
Conversely, Rick Hills has put out a call for “specific regional 
arrangements,” grounded in empirical reality, that “minimally affect 
citizens’ capacity and willingness to show up at hearings, educate 
themselves in the workings of democratic systems, and learn the arts of 
democratic governance.”379 This Article provides one data point to aid the 
search for such arrangements. I have shown that citizens themselves 
place a low value on local legislatures as fora for democratic 
participation, even as they eagerly crowd meeting rooms to engage with 
local bureaucracies. It may be that maximizing regionalism’s equities and 
efficiencies alongside localism’s participation requires shifting 
policymaking to higher levels of government while devolving 
administration down.380 
Acknowledging local unicameralism will not (and should not!) turn 
localists into regionalists, or vice versa. It is just one fact about local 
governments¾albeit an important one¾and here I have sketched its 
relevance to just one aspect of the localism debate. But the localism 
debate has been blinkered by its failure to consider the structural aspects 
of local government. The localists and the regionalists alike have treated 
local governments as smaller and more subordinate than states or 
regional governments, but not as differently designed.  
Take education, for example. It is not enough to ask whether 
education policy and finance should be decentralized or centralized. In 
one region, decentralization might inevitably mean decisionmaking not 
just by locals, but by independently elected school districts, operating 
without separation of powers and, yes, organized unicamerally. 
Centralization would bring with it the entire state constitutional 
structure: perhaps a bicameral legislature and an education department 
separately controlled by the governor. The intergovernmental aspects of 
local government law do not exist independently of its  
 
 378. Cf. Erika K. Wilson, Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public 
Education, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1465–66 (2014) (describing existing “regionalist-like interdistrict 
desegregation programs”).  
 379. Hills, supra note 342, at 2034.  
 380. Or maybe not. Administration is already largely localized¾frontline bureaucrats like teachers 
and firefighters are generally local employees. So this “proposal” may simply reflect the accumulated 
wisdom of the status quo. Moreover, the politics/administration dichotomy is dead and buried. See 
Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Courts, a Protected Bureaucracy, and Reinventing 
Government, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 818 n.180 (1995). If zoning decisions, for example, are made 
through a series of site-specific exceptions rather than a predetermined zoning map or comprehensive 
plan, (see Noah M. Kazis, Public Actors, Private Law: Local Governments’ Use of Covenants to 
Regulate Land Use, 124 YALE L.J. 1790, 1802–03 (2015)), is it possible for land use policy be set forth 
regionally without abandoning local administration? As Hills himself said, any balancing of localism 
and regionalism will be “always tentative.” Hills, supra note 343, at 2034.  
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intra-governmental, structural dimensions. This Article aims to help 
bring structure back into the analysis for localists and regionalists alike.  
B. INTERPRETING STATUTES FROM UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURES  
Local unicameralism also has implications outside local government 
law, at least as the field is narrowly defined. Statutory interpretation is 
one of the central functions of the judiciary381 and a subject of extensive 
scholarly and judicial debate. However, as those debates rage on and as 
interpretive methodologies are refined, there is an unspoken assumption 
that the statutes being interpreted were enacted by Congress or by state 
legislatures with a very similar structure.382 Prominent theories of 
interpretation, spanning the ideological spectrum, rely on the premise 
that legislation is passed bicamerally. At the local level, where all 
legislatures are unicameral, those theories do not apply. A new 
appreciation of local unicameralism (and local legislative difference more 
generally) will require the development of new interpretive theories, and 
the adaptation of old ones, for the local context. As an example, this Part 
discusses the use of legislative history at the local level, suggesting that, 
all things being equal, courts should be more willing to look to legislative 
history in a unicameral context than when reviewing state or federal 
legislation.  
Courts have long used legislative history to guide the interpretation 
of ambiguous statutory provisions,383 but the use of legislative history has 
become controversial. Beginning in the 1980s, the New Textualists, led 
by Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook, generated a 
comprehensive critique of purposive methods of statutory interpretation, 
including reliance on legislative history.384 While this critique drew force 
from numerous sources, one strand of the New Textualism held that the 
use of legislative history was unconstitutional: unlike legislative text, 
legislative history was not enacted by both houses of Congress and 
presented to the President for a signature. Whatever the merits of this 
argument, it plainly does not apply to local governments. Neither the text 
of Article I nor its spirit applies to local legislation.  
The constitutional attack on the use of legislative history is rooted in 
Article I, Section 7 of the federal Constitution.385 That section lays out the 
 
 381. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1275 (2001) 
(“The twentieth century inaugurated an age of statutes or, as we prefer, an era of super-statutes.”). 
 382. In short remarks given at N.Y.U., Richard Briffault challenged this assumption, listing a 
plethora of differences between the national legislative process and those at the state and local levels, 
including stronger legislative leaders, shorter sessions and part-time legislators, line-item vetoes, and 
a lack of separation of powers. Briffault, supra note 22, at 24–29. 
 383. See Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457, 463–64 (1892). 
 384. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1288–92 (2010). 
 385. Victoria F. Nourse, The Constitution and Legislative History, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 313, 324–
25 (2014). 
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requirements for the enactment of a statute, including passage in both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate (bicameralism) and the 
assent of the President (presentment).386 Since committee reports, floor 
statements and other forms of legislative history are not voted on by even 
one full chamber, much less by both, it is argued that they violate the 
bicameralism and presentment requirements.387 As Justice Scalia wrote, 
“[a]n enactment by implication cannot realistically be regarded as the 
product of the difficult lawmaking process our Constitution has 
prescribed. Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies 
between Congressmen . . . are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon 
the text of a law and its presentment to the President.”388 
While the unconstitutionality of using legislative history is only one 
argument for textualism, it is a particularly important one.389 Most 
arguments for textualism are pragmatic, rooted in a sense that legislative 
history is unhelpful or misleading.390 In contrast, the bicameralism and 
presentment argument suggests that reliance on legislative history is 
impermissible.391 But for courts reviewing local legislation, this uniquely 
powerful argument does not apply at all.  
Obviously, Article I does not formally bind local governments. It 
governs how Congress enacts laws. In a literal sense, Section 7 refers to 
the House of Representatives, the Senate and the President; it does not 
govern legislative processes generally. The federal constitution does not, 
by any argument, forbid the use of legislative history by nonfederal 
legislatures. 
That said, many sophisticated textualists see the spirit, not the text, 
of Article I as barring the use of legislative history. John Manning, for 
example, acknowledges that Article I, Section 7 only governs what texts 
 
 386. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.  
 387. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1526–27 (1998) 
(reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)).  
 388. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191–92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also In re 
Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) 
The Constitution establishes a complex of procedures, including presidential approval (or 
support by two-thirds of each house). It would demean the constitutionally prescribed 
method of legislating to suppose that its elaborate apparatus for deliberation on, amending, 
and approving a text is just a way to create some evidence about the law, while the real 
source of legal rules is the mental processes of legislators. 
 389. Cf. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The greatest defect 
of legislative history is its illegitimacy . . . . As the Court said in 1844: ‘The law as it passed is the will 
of the majority of both houses . . . .’” (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845)). 
 390. John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, 
Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 494 (2001).  
 391. Id. Moreover, as Victoria Nourse has argued, the stakes of the constitutional argument against 
legislative history are high not only for statutory interpretation (itself a central element of the modern 
judicial role) but also for constitutional law more broadly. Nourse, supra note 385, at  
318–24 (describing issue’s relationship with countermajoritarian difficulty and theories of judicial 
review). 
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are enacted as law, not how to interpret those texts.392 Since textualists 
frequently refer to dictionaries or the common law as interpretive 
aids¾and neither are passed through bicameralism¾the argument 
against legislative history must go beyond what Article I formally 
requires.393 Even so, Manning finds the purpose and function of the 
bicameralism requirement important, arguing that bicameralism 
promotes caution, deliberation and adversarial debate, while checking 
government power and preventing special interest or factional legislation 
from being enacted.394 According to Manning and other textualists, the 
values underlying bicameralism require avoiding legislative history, even 
where the formal requirements of Article I do not.395 Judicial language 
from leading textualists like Justice Scalia or Judge Easterbrook likewise 
highlights the bicameral process as importantly “difficult” or 
“elaborate.”396  
For local governments, though, the values of bicameralism are as 
immaterial as the formal requirements of Article I. Local government has 
not adopted the structure of bicameralism, and it has not adopted 
bicameralism’s values. It does not see bicameralism as a necessary block 
on special interest legislation and dismisses deliberation in favor of 
efficiency. At the state and federal levels, it can be argued that 
bicamerally enacted legislative text is more likely to promote the public 
interest than single-chamber public history, but at the local level, 
everything is single chambered and that is deemed a virtue. Using 
legislative history to interpret local legislation may still be unwise, but 
there is nothing in the federal constitution suggesting as much.397 
 
 392. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 71–72 
(2001). 
 393. Id.  
 394. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 708–10 
(1997) (“To appreciate the importance of adopting interpretive rules designed to preserve the integrity 
of the constitutionally prescribed legislative process, it is helpful to recall the context that gave rise to 
the inclusion of bicameralism and presentment in the Constitution.”).  
 395. But see Eskridge, supra note 388, at 1527 (taking contrary position, that “principle (or spirit) 
derived from Article I, Section 7 is unlikely to support the new textualism”).  
 396. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191–92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); In 
re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343–44 (7th Cir. 1989).  
 397. Some pragmatic arguments against the use of legislative history may also be inapplicable in 
the local context. For example, textualists deny the possibility of discerning collective intent from a 
multimember legislature. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 
546 (1983). Local legislatures, unlike Congress or state legislatures, can more plausibly speak in one 
voice, since they are comprised of only one chamber, and usually a small one at that. There is a 
dramatically smaller gap between the positions of a single member of a local legislature¾who after all 
may be one of three or five total members¾and the intent of the legislature as a whole. But others, 
such as the manipulability of legislative history by lawmakers or judges, see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005), or the high cost to litigants of legislative history 
research, cf. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, 
the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 380–81 (2013) 
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The overall force of this argument depends, of course, on one’s prior 
position on legislative history. It rebuts only one argument against 
legislative history: a committed textualist will still find reason to oppose 
its use, even in interpreting local legislation. Even so, the fact of local 
unicameralism should influence statutory interpretation, at least on the 
margin. The constitutionally inspired arguments against legislative 
history do not apply to local ordinances. Judges should apply a lighter 
touch with their textualism in the local context and in particular, should 
eschew interpretive methodologies that make no allowance for the 
profound differences in legislative structure at the local level.398  
Local unicameralism should also have wider repercussions on the 
interpretation of local legislation, beyond the specific technique of using 
legislative history, although the direction of those repercussions may be 
less clear. Take, for example, the public choice-inspired debate over how 
statutory interpretation can best promote the public interest, as opposed 
to special interests. Jonathan Macey has argued that because the 
bicameral structure of Congress makes Congress more difficult for 
narrow factions to capture, it promotes “public-regarding” legislation.399 
He therefore endorses traditional, holistic approaches to statutory 
interpretation.400 William Eskridge, however, cites the same public 
choice scholars but reaches a quite different conclusion.401 For Eskridge, 
bicameralism is a hurdle that intensely focused special interests can clear 
but which can trip up diffusely supported  
general-interest legislation.402 He would interpret statutes with 
asymmetrical benefits and burdens narrowly or broadly, as needed, to 
compensate for the structural effects of bicameralism.403  
 
(identifying federal government and elite Washington lawyers as specially able to wield legislative 
history arguments).  
  Moreover, attempts to use local legislative history will pose their own special challenges, 
particularly the limited volume and low quality of the legislative history that may exist locally. 
Briffault, supra note 23, at 25 (noting that many local legislatures lack committee reports or reports 
on floor debates). Whether these challenges can or should be overcome is a complicated question¾but 
not one to which the federal constitution or common textualist arguments speak.  
 398. State courts, in particular, tend to apply fixed methodological approaches. See Abbe R. Gluck, 
The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New 
Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1754 (2010). These methodologies do not make allowances 
for the state/local distinction. See, e.g., Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 
1143, 1146–47 (Or. 1993) (mandating approach for “interpreting a statute” generally).  
 399. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 247–48 (1986).  
 400. Id. at 227.  
 401. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory 
for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 291 (1988). 
 402. Id.  
 403. Id. at 323–24. 
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Both Macey and Eskridge (and the many scholars working in a 
public choice tradition since)404 extract entire theories of statutory 
interpretation from their analysis of the legislative process. But when 
that process changes¾such as from bicameralism to 
unicameralism¾their theories must change as well. Because the 
implications of public choice scholarship for statutory interpretation are 
not settled¾and are not likely to be settled any time soon¾local 
unicameralism is a fact that can cut many ways.  
One might hypothesize that local ordinances should be interpreted 
more purposively. To the extent that local government is less deliberative 
and more reactive, could its enactments all be seen as akin to remedial 
legislation, which should be interpreted broadly?405 Arguably, if local 
legislation is generally a quick-and-dirty attempt to fix a nagging 
problem, courts should be more willing to partner with the legislature 
and help secure the legislation’s goals. Or, because local government can 
more easily amend its legislation, perhaps courts could be less afraid of a 
proactive, but erroneous, interpretation.406 Given how little can be stated 
decisively about how structure affects lawmaking, though, particularly at 
the understudy local level, these must remain only hypotheses.  
Still, any interpretive methodology based on an empirical 
understanding of the legislative process must account for the empirical 
reality that local legislatures are not like state or federal legislatures.407 
Indeed, they have been consciously designed to diverge from the federal 
model. Yet process-sensitive theories of statutory interpretation, 
developed with an eye toward Congressional structure, are blindly 
applied to the acts of quite different city councils or county commissions. 
Ours is a tripartite system of government¾federal, state, and local¾and 
legislatively, one of those levels is not like the others. This Article 
provides a first step in the difficult work408 of developing a new approach 
 
 404. See generally MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009).  
 405. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“[W]e are guided by the familiar canon 
of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its 
purposes.”).  
 406. This could support even stronger principles of stare decisis when interpreting local 
legislation. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972).  
 407. This describes many, but not all, theories of statutory interpretation. Judge Posner’s blunt 
realism stands out in this regard. See RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE 
JUDICIARY 1–2 (2016) (endorsing position that judges take the position “that would prevail if resort to 
traditional legal materials were disallowed”).  
 408. Recently, scholars have turned their attention to unpacking the messy details of Congressional 
process in order to refine statutory interpretation. See generally Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside¾An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, 
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. 
Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside¾An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, 
Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. 
Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 
KAZIS-69.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/26/18 12:49 PM 
May 2018]     AMERICAN UNICAMERALISM  1215 
to interpretation that acknowledges the unicameral local legislative 
process¾with its strengths and its weaknesses¾that we have chosen.409 
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LOCAL MAJORITARIANISM 
Statutory interpretation is not the only judicial task affected by local 
unicameralism. Judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation 
must also adapt to the unique qualities of local legislative structure. 
Theories of judicial review are inherently theories about the 
interrelationship of courts and legislatures, about their respective 
strengths, weaknesses, and perhaps most importantly, their charges 
within a given constitutional structure.410 Different 
legislatures¾reflecting different visions of good governance¾should be 
reviewed differently. Moreover, the debates over judicial review are 
plagued by the “countermajoritarian difficulty.”411 Local legislatures are, 
by design, dramatically more majoritarian than Congress. Whatever 
uneasy conclusions about majoritarianism have been reached for judicial 
review of state and national legislation, they cannot hold at the local level. 
Local unicameralism demands its own jurisprudence. In this Subpart, I 
briefly set forth one tentative vision for an institutionally aware, localist 
judicial review: A hands-off approach to most local legislation, meant to 
support local experimentation and initiative, paired with tougher judicial 
scrutiny of legislation affecting certain minorities.  
Many of the most prominent theories of judicial review draw 
inspiration and legal grounding from the structure of government set 
forth in the Constitution.412 Take, for example, John Hart Ely’s 
 
(2002). These scholars distinguish between types of legislative history, finding some more reliable 
than others, and wade into the details of “unorthodox lawmaking.” BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX 
LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (5th ed. 2017). The same work may 
need to be done anew at the local level¾but across tens of thousands of governments, each with their 
own institutions and their own traditions.  
 409. One fascinating avenue of inquiry would be the value of time in the local legislative process. 
Frank Easterbrook identified “lack of time as a vital ingredient” in the legislative process, noting that 
even popular bills often fail to be enacted because the clock runs out before Congress can act. 
Easterbrook, supra note 397, at 539. Based on this, Easterbrook argues that post-enactment legislative 
action (short of amendment) should not affect the interpretation of a statute. Id. In unicameral local 
legislatures, which are designed to pass bills with greater efficiency and less deliberation, the 
ingredient of “time” may (or may not) have substantially different meaning. 
 410. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 
1361–64 (2006) (describing assumptions about legislative and judicial institutions on which his 
philosophical case against judicial review relies). 
 411. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 
1014 (1984) (describing countermajoritarian difficulty as “the starting point for contemporary analysis 
of judicial review”).  
 412. Many theories of judicial review, of course, do not. Certain forms of textualism and 
originalism reject this sort of structural argument, for example. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 788–89 (1999) (discussing how both “plain-meaning” and “original intent” 
textualists are each “clause-bound”). Bruce Ackerman has forcefully argued that process and 
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“representation-reinforcing” theory of judicial review,413 as influential a 
vision as any in legal scholarship.414 Ely laid out a two-step analysis. He 
first looked to the structure of the Constitution, from one-off clauses415 
to overall legislative design,416 to find its “pervasive strategy,” which he 
believed to be a pluralist guarantee that no one faction could uniformly 
dominate others.417 He then offered a method for judicial intervention to 
correct failures in that strategy: in his case, by protecting political 
dissidents or racial minorities shut out of pluralist bargaining.418 Under 
Ely’s approach¾or any other theory of judicial review rooted in 
constitutional structure¾the judge’s role is to further the particular 
brand of self-government put forward by the Constitution.  
Bicameralism is a central structural feature of the federal 
Constitution, and as might be expected, it plays a prominent role in 
structuralist theories of judicial review. Cass Sunstein, for example, has 
identified bicameralism as an embodiment of “the central republican 
understanding that disagreement can be a creative force” and an effort to 
create a “constitutional framework” of “deliberative democracy.”419 For 
Sunstein, the Constitution’s wide distribution of power¾within the 
legislature, across branches, and between the states and federal 
government¾forces politicians to work through disagreement and gain 
 
substance cannot be disentangled, as Ely and others would have it. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond 
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718–19 (1985). One might believe that judges should be 
counter-majoritarian or majoritarian on principle, regardless of how citizens opt to structure their 
legislatures. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term¾Foreword: The Vanishing 
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989) (describing history of majoritarianism and counter-
majoritarianism in constitutional law). Local unicameralism will have different effects on different 
theories of judicial review, and in some is likely to prove entirely immaterial. What I to hope 
demonstrate, though, is that theories of judicial review cannot be mechanically carried over from the 
state or federal context to the local; local unicameralism is so fundamental a difference in legislative 
process that it must be taken into account. 
 413. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 88 (1980).  
 414. Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory,  
77 VA. L. REV. 721, 721 (1991) (“Few, if any, books have had the impact on constitutional theory of John 
Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust.”). 
 415. ELY, supra note 413, at 90 (Ex Post Facto Clause); ELY, supra note 414, at 96 (Takings Clause).  
 416. ELY, supra note 413, at 90. 
 417. ELY, supra note 413, at 80. Ely of course marshals other arguments for his representation-
reinforcing vision of judicial review. In particular, he points to the “underlying premises of the 
American system of representative democracy” and the core competencies of the judiciary. ELY, supra 
note 413, at 88. The “underlying premises” of the American system are, like the structure of 
government, different at the local level than at the national level. The competencies of the judiciary 
may be the same. 
 418. ELY, supra note 413, at 102–03 (recommending that constitutional adjudication intervene in 
the political process only: 
when the process is undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of 
political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no 
one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are 
systematically disadvantaging some minority . . . .  
 419. Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1562. 
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the benefits of competition, debate and dissent.420 Then, having found 
civic republicanism (and not only individualistic liberalism) to drive the 
Constitutional vision of government, Sunstein argues courts should be 
friendly to federalism, support campaign finance regulation, loosen 
Establishment Clause limits on religious organization, inspect the 
rationality of statutes, and adopt antisubordination conceptions of equal 
protection.421  
Subsequent civic republicans have likewise identified bicameralism 
as a foundation for their constitutional vision. That vision can take many 
forms. Bicameralism has been used to support, on the one hand, an 
expansion of judicial power into overseeing the legislative process (rather 
than only outcomes),422 and, on the other hand, a broadside against the 
constitutionality of “expansive judicial power.”423 Civic republicans John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport argue that “the central principle 
underlying the Constitution is governance through supermajority rules,” 
one of which is the bicameralist structure of Congress.424 They conclude 
that this principle requires textualist and originalist approaches to 
judicial review, to ensure that judicial decisionmaking does not usurp the 
broad consensus required for supermajority enactments.425 
Nor are civic republicans the only ones to summon bicameralism in 
support of their constitutional vision. Many scholars see bicameralism as 
part of a distinctly libertarian constitutional vision.426 A very deep 
literature analyzes whether plebiscites ought to be subject to special 
judicial scrutiny due to their deviations from the standard legislative 
model¾including their lack of a bicameral check¾and scholars come 
out both ways.427 The list could go on. This brief and entirely  
 
 420. Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1562. 
 421. Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1576–81. For a description of the “anti-subordination” vision of 
the Equal Protection Clause, see generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004).  
 422. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 
91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1934–35 (2011).  
 423. Jack Wade Nowlin, The Constitutional Illegitimacy of Expansive Judicial Power: A Populist 
Structural Interpretive Analysis, 89 KY. L.J. 387, 412–13 (2000–2001). 
 424. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 703, 705 (2002).  
 425. Id. at 802–05.  
 426. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2386–87 n.1474 (2002) (“The 
purpose of the federalist structure, the national separation of powers, and the bicameralism and 
presentment requirements for lawmaking are largely libertarian.”); Gillian Metzger, Michael Greve’s 
The Upside Down Constitution: Parasitic Federalism and the Ambiguities of Constitutional 
Structure, BALKINIZATION (June 17, 2013), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/michael-greves-
upside-down-constitution.html (describing bicameralism as supporting claim that the federal 
Constitution establishes a system of “competitive federalism”).  
 427. See, e.g., Robin Charlow, Judicial Review Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 
79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 547 (1994); Eule, supra note 180, at 1584 (“[W]hen the state departs from the 
vision reflected in each of the first three Articles¾a bicameral legislative body, an executive with the 
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non-exhaustive review of the relationship between bicameralism and 
judicial review is not meant to survey the field or to prove any particular 
case. It is meant only to illustrate that, across issue area and across 
ideologies, scholars turn to the structure of the Constitution generally, 
and the fact of bicameralism specifically, to root their theories of judicial 
review. Put simply, bicameralism is a big deal for judicial review. 
But despite the prevalence of unicameralism at the local level, there 
is no equivalent literature on the implications of unicameralism for 
judicial review. In the American context,428 the closest article addresses 
the state level, and expressly disclaims any applicability to local 
government. James Rogers has argued for special standards of judicial 
review for Nebraska’s unicameral state legislature, specifically arguing 
that courts should apply stricter scrutiny to unicameral legislative 
enactments.429 Bicameralism, he asserts, provides a check against 
factional legislation and introduces more empirical information to the 
overall legislative process.430 Rogers therefore concludes that “there 
must be an increase in the rigor of judicial review to substitute for the 
loss of legislative review otherwise accorded by second chambers.”431 
Whatever the merits of Rogers’ argument¾and there are reasons to be 
skeptical of his positive claims432¾it does not apply to local 
governments, as he freely admits. Rogers essentially argues that two 
heads are better than one, and local governments are already overseen 
by the states.433 
What is missing, therefore, is a theory of judicial review that 
accounts for local unicameralism. As Clayton Gillette has observed, 
“[v]irtually the entire literature that assesses judicial interpretation 
 
power to veto, and an independent judiciary . . . Federal court invocation of the Bill of Rights . . . may 
well be the only line of defense against majoritarian tyranny.”); Baker, supra note 50, at 716 (arguing 
that despite differences between plebiscitary and legislative lawmaking, including bicameralism as the 
“most obvious difference[]”). 
 428. This Article does not look comparatively at other countries where unicameral legislatures are 
common at the national or state/provincial level. See, e.g., Dinan, supra note 211, at 857–58 
(discussing common pattern among federations of bicameral national legislature and unicameral state 
legislatures, as well as exceptions). For now, I proceed one institutional variable at a time.  
 429. Rogers, supra note 187, at 66.  
 430. Rogers, supra note 187, at 96, 99.  
 431. Rogers, supra note 187, at 110. Rogers also notes that historically, Nebraska’s unicameral 
legislature emerged during the tail end of the Lochner era and its proponents expressly understood 
the judiciary to be taking such an active role. Rogers, supra note 187, at 79–80.  
 432. For example, it seems implausible that the upper and lower chambers of a legislature would 
have access to different empirical information, given both modern information technology and 
political polarization. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006). And, as noted, supra notes 400–04 and accompanying text, it is not 
clear whether bicameralism empowers or disempowers special interests.  
 433. Rogers, supra note 430, at 107 n.140 (“[E]ven though the legislative authority of local 
governments is typically exercised by a unicameral assembly . . . . [T]heir legislative powers and 
decisions are already subject to state legislative oversight.”). 
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comprises debates about the appropriate scope of federal court 
intervention into federal legislation.”434 Gillette himself has gone a long 
way to filling this gap. His book Local Redistribution and Local 
Democracy¾ostensibly about the narrow question of when local 
governments should be allowed to redistribute income¾weaves together 
everything from state constitutional law to urban public choice theory 
and produces an entirely novel argument for how state judges should 
police the line between local and state authority.435 My aim is to provide 
another brick in that wall, offering a hypothesis of how unicameralism 
fits into theories of judicial review of local action.  
Based upon this Article’s analysis of local unicameralism, I conclude 
that process-conscious courts should be more accommodating of local 
legislation and¾with an important exception¾subject it to less scrutiny. 
Local governments turned to unicameralism in order to make their 
legislative processes more efficient, nimble, and responsive. To the extent 
that judicial review should reflect structural constitutional choices, 
courts ought to honor and support those goals of efficiency. Second-
guessing¾by an upper chamber or a reviewing court¾is not what the 
designers of local government had in mind when they installed 
unicameralism.436 In the local vision of democracy, the proper protection 
against bad legislation is a subsequent majority quickly and easily 
repealing the law, not roadblocks to the law’s enactment in the first place. 
Courts attempting to match their review of legislation to the process by 
which that legislation is passed should look positively on local initiative 
and loosen judicial strictures on local legislation.437 
At the same time, local unicameralism has a darker side, one that 
triggers the countermajoritarian role of the judiciary. Local 
unicameralism is also rooted in the confidence of majorities in their own 
ability to protect themselves even at the expense of minorities. Popular 
comfort with unicameralism at the local level depends on an assumption 
that “people like me” will be in charge and stay in charge¾hence the 
strength of unicameralism in homogeneous, homevoter-dominated 
 
 434. GILLETTE, supra note 50, at 109.  
 435. See generally GILLETTE, supra note 50. 
 436. Of course, local government is hemmed in by all sorts of legal restrictions. See FRUG & 
BARRON, supra note 220, at 1–4. Indeed, many of the same individuals pushing for local 
unicameralism were good government Progressives who were highly skeptical of local power, which 
they saw as generally used in service of corrupt aims; these were not strong home rule advocates. See, 
e.g., Barron, supra note 279, at 2285–86. My claim is only that all else being equal, local 
unicameralism cuts in one direction: toward lighter judicial scrutiny of local ordinances.  
 437. There are many affinities between this conclusion and the literature on “experimentalism” in 
government, which emphasizes the role of local governments in national governance and the need for 
policy innovation. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); cf. David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: 
Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 549–59 
(2008) (summarizing, and critiquing, experimentalist literature). 
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suburbs. For those shut out, the argument for judicial deference turns on 
its head. When majorities trample on distinct minorities shut out of the 
permanent homevoter coalition, local unicameralism offers courts a 
justification for greater scrutiny: the democratic processes have been 
designed to ignore minority voice, leaving the courts as the only 
institution well-positioned to vindicate minority rights.  
Doctrinally, courts could potentially root this heightened scrutiny in 
prohibitions on animus-based lawmaking.438 A unicameral legislature 
can react more swiftly, or even impulsively, and with a more unified 
purpose, than a bicameral body. Thus, when a law targets a local 
minority, courts should be more willing to find that law a product of 
impermissible animus, rather than a legitimate policy outcome with 
winners and losers. Indeed, courts may already engage in this kind of 
reasoning implicitly.439 
Likewise, when mobility is restricted (for example, by exclusionary 
land use policies or other forms of housing discrimination), some groups 
are denied the protections of Tiebout competition on which local 
unicameralism rests. Judges should step in: groups denied all the 
benefits of majoritarianism should not be obligated to bear all its costs.  
In a sense, local unicameralism supercharges the Ely approach to 
judicial review. Local constitutional structure shows a greater demand 
for the quick translation of majority preferences into policy—a 
constitutional vision which judges should normally help instantiate¾but 
heightens the fear that certain groups will be shut out altogether.  
In many ways, this approach to local legislation is already a popular 
instinct. Local government boosters praise its ability to innovate.440 
Opponents see it as exclusionary.441 Both groups see local legislation as 
basically efficacious¾whether banning smoking442 or harassing the 
homeless,443 local governments are understood as getting the job done. 
Foregrounding unicameralism helps build a framework for better 
understanding these twin features of local government. Local 
government is, by its very design, aggressively majoritarian, warts and 
 
 438. See Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 
183 (2013); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012). 
 439. Compare Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–42 
(1993), with Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 593–601 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(espousing different attitudes toward ability to infer intent and animus of local versus federal 
governments).  
 440. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: DYSFUNCTIONAL NATIONS, 
RISING CITIES 3–8 (2013); BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: HOW 
CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY 1–5 (2013).  
 441. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 352, at 1870–74. 
 442. See Diller, supra note 49, at 1225–36.  
 443. See Anthony D. Lauriello, Panhandling Regulation After Reed v. Town of Gilbert,  
116 COLUM. L. REV. 1105, 1118–23 (2016) (describing local efforts to limit where and how panhandling 
can take place).  
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all. Judicial review of local legislation should conform to that  
hyper-majoritarianism, bending to its benefits and challenging its 
abuses.  
CONCLUSION 
By drafting a constitution outlining the structure of a national 
government, the Framers put forward a vision for American democracy. 
Local government has its own constitutional arrangements 
¾unicameralism included¾and its own constitutional vision. That 
vision imagines the legislature as resolutely majoritarian, streamlined 
and efficient, an instrument for translating resident demands into policy. 
The executive branch sits at the center of this constitutional vision, which 
in turns requires unifying the legislature to serve as a counterweight.  
This local constitutional vision is not an alternative to federal 
constitutionalism. Rather, it is embedded in an integrated, national 
constitutional order where each level of government has its own part to 
play. Local government structure reflects the pressures of state and 
federal oversight, the push and pull of Tiebout competition, and the 
demands of overseeing bureaucracies that must deliver service  
block by block. In response, local government has developed into 
something all its own: different not just in size or subordinate status, but 
in structure.  
Like any other constitutionalism, local government’s particular 
vision is multifaceted and even self-contradictory. Local unicameralism 
demonstrates the immense trust that many Americans hold in their local 
legislatures,444 which they empower to act without check or balance. But 
that trust is earned in part because local governments have been 
impaired by the states and boxed in by competition with each other. Local 
unicameralism is the product of local power and local powerlessness, 
held in tension. Likewise, local unicameralism is  
hyper-democratic on the one hand. But on the other, it reflects local 
governments’ formal status, and sometimes practical operation, as little 
more than administrative agencies: not sites of culturally rich self-rule 
but of cold instrumentalism. Moreover, these contradictions are played 
out not once, as with the national constitution, but in tens of thousands 
of individual contexts: large cities and small towns, rural counties and 
specialized single-purpose districts, each one different. We have 
contested the meaning of the national constitution since its enactment; 
settling the meaning of our local constitutions will not prove any more 
straightforward.  
 
 444. Cf. State Governments Viewed Favorably as Federal Rating Hits New Low, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/15/state-govermnents-viewed-favorably-as-
federal-rating-hits-new-low/ (polls find local government rated more favorably than either state or 
federal government). 
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Even so, understanding local government requires appreciating its 
distinct constitutional vision, whatever it might be, and rooting that 
vision in the details of local structure. Citizens voting in referenda, 
neighborhood activists on charter reform committees, state legislators 
passing incorporation statutes: all have chosen different institutions of 
self-governance for the local level. And every day, around the country, 
the members of our unicameral legislatures¾city councilors, county 
commissioners, school board members, trustees, freeholders, aldermen, 
supervisors, and all the rest¾take on those challenges of  
self-governance. It is time for courts and scholars alike to recognize that 
their unicameralism is every bit as much a part of the American 
constitutional order as Congress’s two chambers. 
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